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Introduction
THE LEGAL STATUS OF AUTHORSHIP has become increasingly
easier to acquire under the U.S. copyright regime. For example, case
law establishes a low threshold for originality, previously-mandated
formality requirements are extinguished, and the pervasive spread of
information and communication technologies (ICTs)1 makes fixa-
tion2 in a tangible medium of expression a condition that is easily
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1. For example, the Internet, wireless networks, cell phones, and other communica-
tion technologies that provide access to information through telecommunications. ICT,
TECHTERMS.COM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/ict (last visited June 14, 2014).
2. See infra Part I.
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fulfilled even by mundane communicative expressions.3 Indeed, some
scholars note that copyright law has expanded in a way that may do
disservice to its underlying purpose to “promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and [the] useful Arts.”4 By granting copyright too easily and too
widely, the current regime is inadequate as (1) it rewards pedestrian
works that do little to promote useful arts and sciences;5 (2) it fails to
increase the number of works produced despite the pecuniary incen-
tive that copyright protection provides;6 and (3) it increases the cost
for the production of future works.7 By opening additional channels
of distribution, ICTs also weaken the role of traditional publishers.8
Individuals with basic technological knowledge can bypass traditional
media and forums, such as journals, newspapers, and magazines, to
express themselves and connect with one another.9 Among those who
make their works available on the Internet, some take a step further to
adopt a private ordering strategy,10 which can bring together mem-
3. See Joseph Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 458 (2009).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 77-78 (2001);
Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of
Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 856 (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW
BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCKDOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIV-
ITY 131, 249-50 (2004).
5. See Miller, supra note 3, at 463-64.
6. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANS-
FORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 4-5, 96-98 (2006) (discussing non-market motivations for
actors producing information and knowledge).
7. See Ann Bartow, Copyrights and Creative Copying, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 75, 89-
90 (2004) (suggesting that the fear of copyright infringement lawsuits discourages poten-
tial authors from building upon existing copyrighted works); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FU-
TURE OF IDEAS 199-217 (2001) (arguing that intellectual property law is an artificial system
designed to promote innovation, but too much protection stifles progress and allows the
interests of those who benefit from more protection to dictate the development of the law
and drive new competitors out of the field).
8. See Andrew Richard Albanese, PW Select December 2012: Miami Advice, PUBLISHERS
WEEKLY (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/authors/pw-se
lect/article/55226-pw-select-december-2012-miami-advice.html (stating that self-publishing
has been widely accepted by readers and would-be-authors); Clay Shirky, Newspaper and
Thinking the Unthinkable, CLAY SHIRKY BLOG (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.shirky.com/
weblog/2009/03/newspapers-and-thinking-the-unthinkable/ (discussing the hardships the
Internet created for traditional print newspapers, and arguing that while our society still
needs journalism, newspapers should not be the only distribution model); Mary Ann Ken-
nan, The Economic Implications of Alternative Publishing Models: Views from a Non-economist, 28
PROMETHEUS 85, 86-87 (2010).
9. See Michael Keren, Blogging and Mass Politics, 33 BIOGRAPHY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
QUARTERLY 110, 110 (2010).
10. Compulsory Terms and Private Ordering, THE BRIDGE, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
bridge/LegalProcess/compulsory.htm (last visited June 7, 2014) (explaining that private
orders are regulations voluntarily initiated and implemented by private, non-government
parties).
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bers of the public to contribute to a collaborative work.11 Armed with
the legal status of authors and copyright owners, such producers still
permit the public to access and use their copyrighted works in various
ways.12 These strategies are intended to encourage wide distribution
and discussion, such as blogging and citizen journalism,13 as well as to
enable larger collaborative projects like free software development
and Wikipedia.14
Although the expansion of social media and peer-production
models may have led to an unprecedented decentralization of knowl-
edge and information production,15 it does not guarantee that those
who publish through non-traditional channels are heard or appreci-
ated. One’s societal authority and impact as an author cannot be ob-
tained merely by receiving authorship status under copyright law.16
Though it is easy to acquire the legal status of an author and the ac-
companying property rights, symbolic resources such as one’s reputa-
tion, prestige, credibility, and authority in the field are not.17
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 391-92 (2005) (discussing GNU
General Public Licenses, other free software licenses, and Creative Commons’ licenses au-
thors can obtain to permit public access and use of their copyrighted works).
13. See, e.g., What is Global Voices?, GLOBAL VOICES, http://globalvoicesonline.org/
about/ (last visited July 15, 2014). To encourage wide distribution, Global Voices publishes
under a Creative Commons Attribution-Only license. Attribution Policy, GLOBAL VOICES,
http://globalvoicesonline.org/about/global-voices-attribution-policy/ (last visited Jan. 15,
2014).
14. See Wikipedia: Copyrights, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Copyrights (last modified Oct. 30, 2014).
15. See Sharon Meraz, Is There an Elite Hold? Traditional Media to Social Media Agenda
Setting Influence in Blog Networks, 14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 682, 684 (2009), available
at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2009.01458.x/full. “The inde-
pendent blog platform is redistributing power between traditional media and citizen me-
dia. . . . Unlike traditional media platforms, independent blog networks are utilizing the
blog tool to allow citizens more influence and power in setting news agendas.” Id. at 701.
16. See id. at 701 (“[T]hough traditional media’s agenda setting power is no longer
the sole influence, its influence still remains a driving, ‘A-list’ force in the creation of blog
agendas.”).
17. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF
TASTE 291 (Richard Nice trans., 1984). Pierre Bourdieu used the concept of “symbolic
capital” to discuss class and status. Id. According to Bourdieu, one’s symbolic capital—
reputation for competence, image of respectability and honourability, can be easily con-
verted into one’s political position to make one notable. Id. In Bourdieu’s discussion of
cultural resources, he argues that an artist’s capital is symbolic capital of recognition—a
condition of being perceived—which assumes the belief of social agents engaged in the
field. PIERRE BOURDIEU, PRACTICAL REASON: ON THE THEORY OF ACTION 102 (1998). These
social agents’ “modes of thought are constituted in such a way that they know and recog-
nize what is proposed to them, and that they believe in it.” Id. at 104. Bourdieu regards
symbolic capital as a “theory of belief or . . . a theory of the production of belief, of the
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This Article stresses the prominence of copyright law’s role,
alongside its property allocation function, in the distribution of sym-
bolic resources. This is because professionalism—the idea that au-
thors are professionals or experts in their respective fields—is
ingrained into the copyright system. This connection is seen through-
out the legislative history of copyright law, as well as in case law, and is
particularly apparent in joint work disputes involving collaborators
having various backgrounds and training.18
Existing literature about the joint work doctrine19 notes that
courts prefer sole ownership of copyrights and recognize joint authors
only grudgingly.20 Some scholars argue that the image of the “roman-
tic author”—a genius who works in solitude and is the only source
from which the resulting work originates, hence deserving sole owner-
ship over a work—is so strong that it overshadows the value contrib-
uted by collaborators.21 Others assert that courts are mainly
concerned with economic efficiency.22 Efficiency is promoted when
work of socialization necessary to produce agents endowed with the schemes of perception
and appreciation that will permit them to perceive” and submit to the rules of the respec-
tive social space. Id. at 103.
This Article uses the more general term, “resources,” in place of “capital” to discuss the
prestige and power that comes with a recognized status in the production of copyrightable
works.
18. See infra Part III.D.
19. The joint work doctrine grants co-ownership in copyrighted works prepared by
two or more authors if they “intended that their contributions be merged into inseparable
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
20. Laura G. Lape, A Narrow View of Creative Cooperation: The Current State of Joint Work
Doctrine, 61 ALB. L. REV. 43, 54 (1997); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copy-
right and Collective Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUALIST APPROPRIA-
TION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 29, 51 (Woodmansee & Jaszi eds. 1994).
21. See Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 291-92 (1992).
[T]he law has yet to be affected by the “critique of authorship” initiated by Fou-
cault and carried forward in the rich variety of post-structuralist research that has
characterized literary studies. . . . Indeed . . . it would seem that as creative pro-
duction becomes more corporate, collective, and collaborative, the law invokes
the Romantic author all the more insistently. There would thus seem to exist both
considerable potential and a pressing need to reestablish communication be-
tween the two disciplines.
Id. at 292.
22. See Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV.
873, 893-94 (1997) (book review). Mark Lemley challenges James Boyle’s view that roman-
tic authorship is fundamental in shaping intellectual property laws, which he found uncon-
vincing. Id. Instead, he argues that the central analytical framework for the development of
modern trends in intellectual property law is a property-based economic theory. Id. at 874.
The rise of property rhetoric in intellectual property is closely identified . . . with
a particular economic view of property rights . . . . This view, which emerge[d]
from the Chicago School law-and-economics movement, emphasizes the impor-
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authors are owners (“owner-authors”), and the copyright system pre-
fers concentrated ownership to a distributed one.23 Both views pro-
vide important insights, but neither yields an adequate framework for
explaining how U.S. courts rule in joint work cases. The notion of the
romantic author could have an impact on judges, but judges are aware
some works have multiple contributors and consciously make policy
choices when allocating property interests.24 The owner-author view
also does little to explain why judges prefer certain types of contribu-
tors. This Article argues that aside from romantic authors and the
owner-authors, there exists a third image of authors as expert profes-
sional practitioners. The image of the “expert author” is a tool for
better understanding the outcomes of joint work cases.
As professionals are more likely to be rewarded with the exclusive
control of copyrighted materials, they in turn also obtain more inter-
pretive authority.25 Copyright law treats exclusive control as a reward
for an author’s contribution to the promotion of the progress of sci-
ence and useful arts. Under this rationale, professional practitioners,
endorsed as expert authors, recursively gain more prestige in society.
By pointing to the conception of expert authors, this Article argues
that the institution of copyright law does not merely allocate material
resources, but also impacts the allocation of symbolic resources, such
as prestige, authority, and power in the production of knowledge.26
tance of private ownership as the solution to . . . the “tragedy of the commons.”
The central idea is that joint or public ownership of a piece of property is ineffi-
cient because nonowners who use the property have no incentive to take care of
it.
Id. at 897.
23. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 161-68.
24. See infra Part III.C-D.
25. Amongst the exclusive rights granted by copyright law, authors often exercise the
right to prepare derivative works and the right to publically perform their works to prevent
unwanted interpretations and associations with particular social contexts. See Deidre A.
Keller, Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right: A Case Comparison and Proposal,
63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 511, 512 (2012); David Hesmondhalgh, Digital Sampling and Cul-
tural Inequality, 15 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 53, 55-57 (2006) (discussing representational polit-
ics—how copyright protects or fails to protect musicians from less powerful social groups).
26. Michel Foucault explains the connection between symbolic resources and power
by describing how a web of normative values influences judges’ modern disciplinary power.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 304 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vantage Books 2d
ed. 1995) (1977). This power shapes individuals, as knowing subjects, and normalizes their
behavior through continuous local struggles. MICHAEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 125-
33 (Colin Gordon eds., 1980). While preserving the local struggles and the bodily disci-
pline, Pierre Bourdieu is more sensitive to the domination between social classes.
BOURDIEU, PRACTICAL REASON: ON THEORY OF ACTION, supra note 17, at 102-03. Symbolic
power disguises the arbitrariness of social categorizations by representing them as legiti-
mate and natural. Individuals adhere to an unreflective view that ensures dominance is
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With unprecedented opportunities to access and exchange cul-
tural works, several copyright scholars aspire to achieve a semiotic de-
mocracy,27 meaning that audiences and consumers are empowered to
interpret cultural symbols differently from the meanings provided by
the authors.28 Nevertheless, without symbolic resources, many views
from individuals or groups are still barred from the meaning-making
process in society.29 This Article seeks to explain how the institution of
copyright affects the distribution of symbolic resources. Recognizing
the image of expert author and the professionalism ingrained in copy-
right law is an important step in reconsidering the relationship be-
tween knowledge and power in society. This comprehension makes
room for the general public to participate more meaningfully, fur-
thering the achievement of a robust semiotic democracy.
While it is true that U.S. copyright law sets a low originality stan-
dard and easily recognizes one’s legal status as an author, Part I of this
Article argues that professionalism is still an integral part of U.S. copy-
right law, and can affect courts’ decisions regarding authorship and
ownership. Part I supports this argument by examining legislative his-
taken as accepted. Cairan Cronin, Bourdieu and Foucault on Power and Modernity, 22 PHIL. &
SOC. CRITICISM 55, 66 (1996).
In the context of knowledge production, individuals are disciplined to recognize certain
information as more reliable or valuable than others when it is produced in a way endorsed
by society. Adhering to the norm appears to save individuals effort in examining the sub-
stance of the information. However, blind adherence to this system also prevents us from
appreciating the knowledge produced by subscribing to an alternative method. This Arti-
cles regards professionalism as one of the symbolic powers in the knowledge production
system that U.S. copyright law has uncritically incorporated.
27. See Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 491 (2006).
28. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE
OF ENTERTAINMENT 30-31 (2004); BENKLER, supra note 6, at 15; Anupam Chander &
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331, 1334-35 (2004).
29. For example, although Wikipedia is an encyclopedia that anyone can edit, indige-
nous communities may find it difficult to have their views included because Wikipedia
prefers references to published literature in order to enhance reliability. Research: Oral Cita-
tions, WIKIMEDIA, https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Research:Oral_Citations
&oldid=3171583 (last modified Dec. 22, 2011). This preference for published material
poses a challenge for communities with strong oral traditions to grow their language on
Wikipedia. Id. Wikipedia applies this editorial policy generally and does not target on in-
digenous communities or colonized societies. Id. When celebrated author Philip Roth
complained about a description about his work on Wikipedia, editors refused to include
Roth’s view because Wikipedia does not consider statements credible unless there is a ref-
erence to a secondary source. Phillip Roth, An Open Letter to Wikipedia, THE NEW YORKER
(Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/books/2012/09/an-open-let
ter-to-wikipedia.html. Within two weeks, Roth managed to have his view published in the
New Yorker, which then met Wikipedia’s reliable requirement. Id. However, not everyone
who disputes Wikipedia contents will be able to have their own views published to gain
reliability.
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tory from events that took place during the two general copyright revi-
sions—the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts. Additionally, Part I provides
facts showing that various professional organizations advocated for the
expansion of copyrightable subject matters. Typically, the organiza-
tions argued that (1) new technologies made their work easier to
reproduce; (2) the societal contributions of their members are not
inferior to those of the professional practitioners who produce copy-
rightable subject matters; and (3) professionals produce better quality
products than amateurs, therefore needing copyright as an incentive
to produce new works.
Part II demonstrates that the justifications professional organiza-
tions used to demand copyright protection for their works cause a
recursive rhetorical divide between professional practitioners and the
lay public. This rhetorical divide solidifies the assumption that profes-
sional practitioners further societal progress and disenfranchises the
lay public in the politics of copyright. Part III analyzes major joint
work cases involving various subject matters and different types of pro-
fessional practitioners. In joint work cases some courts may show a
bias for the party that is a professional practitioner.30 This Article
highlights such bias by analyzing the courts’ reasoning, noting how
the image of an expert author compels courts to privilege collabora-
tors who are not only professionals, but whose practice has a stronger
connection with the subject matter of the disputed work. Part IV dis-
cusses the return of the long-disenfranchised lay public to copyright
politics. The lay public returns by both producing cultural works and
engaging in public debates about copyright reform. However, the un-
equal distribution of symbolic resources continues to marginalize the
contributions and the voices of the lay public.
The Article concludes that the notion of professionalism in copy-
right law provides a new analytical tool for examining the history of
copyright authorship. The exposure of professionalism in U.S. copy-
right law calls for a serious reevaluation of the relationship between
knowledge, symbolic power, and the role copyright plays in endorsing
the credibility and authority of professional practitioners. Profession-
alism is especially important to recognize while examining the recent
copyright politics, and is key to obtaining copyright reform that moves
toward a more inclusive semiotic democracy.
30. Lape, supra note 20, at 63-64 (“Note that where one alleged co-author is a profes-
sional, this circumstance appears to bias some courts against joint authorship.”).
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I. The Expansion of Copyrightable Subject Matter and the
Lobbying by Professional Organizations in Congress
The Progress Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress
has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”31 The subject to
which the Clause refers is the “author,” and the objects stated are his
“writings.”32 However, the Constitution fails to define either “author”
or “writings.” The scope of copyrightable subject matter continuously
expanded as various types of professional practitioners sought to se-
cure and exploit their economic interests through copyright.33 Corre-
spondingly, the concept of an author also expanded to include a
variety of professional practitioners who could obtain exclusive con-
trol of their works.34 The expansion of copyrightable subject matter
often increases the hurdles and costs for professional practitioners in
related fields.35 Not surprisingly, the forces behind the legislative ex-
pansion of copyrightable subject matter typically involved various pro-
fessional organizations, each lobbying for the interests of their own
constituencies.
The Copyright Act of 1790 listed three types of subject matter:
“maps, charts, [and] books.”36 “[D]ramatic composition, designed or
suited for public representation,” was added to the list in the Copy-
right Act Amendment of 1856,37 and photography in the 1865
Amendment.38 The International Copyright Act of 1891 introduced
new protectable subjects such as “painting, drawing, chromo, statue,
statuary, and . . . models or designs intended to be perfected as works
of the fine arts.”39 The 1909 Copyright Act reorganized all the previ-
ously protectable categories into subsections, and also added
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32. Id.
33. See infra Part I.
34. See id.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53, 94-96.
36. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (“[T]he author and authors of any map,
chart, book or books already printed within these United States, being a citizen or citizens
thereof, or resident within the same . . . shall have the sole right and liberty of printing,
reprinting, publishing and vending such map, chart, book or books, for the term of four-
teen years from the recording the title thereof in the clerk’s office, as is herein after
directed.”).
37. Copyright Act Amendment of 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139.
38. Copyright Act Amendment of 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
39. International Copyright Act 1891, ch. 565, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107.
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“[l]ectures, sermons, addresses, prepared for oral delivery.”40 Further,
the 1971 Amendment included sound recordings,41 and the 1976 Act
brought in pantomimes, choreographic works, motion pictures, and
other audiovisual works.42 In 1980, computer software was granted
federal copyright protection.43 In 1990, architectural works became
the latest addition to the long list of copyrightable subject matter.44
The extensive legislative history of the two major copyright revi-
sions, the 1909 Copyright Act and the 1976 Copyright Act, reveal the
strong influence of professional organizations. Such organizations
were invited to participate in preparatory meetings organized by the
Copyright Office and contributed their opinions to the draft bills.45 In
40. Copyright Act of 1909, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076. Copyright protection applied to
the following classes of works: (a) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, direc-
tories, gazetteers, and other compilations; (b) Periodicals, including newspapers; (c) Lec-
tures, sermons, addresses, prepared for oral delivery; (d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical
compositions; (e) Musical compositions; (f) Maps; (g) Works of art; models or designs for
works of art; (h) Reproductions of a work of art; (i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific
or technical character; (j) Photographs; (k) Prints and pictorial illustrations. Id. at 1076-77.
In 1912, two more subsections were added: “(l) Motion-picture photoplays; (m) Motion
pictures other than photoplays.” Act of August 24, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess., 37 Stat. 488. In 1939, subsection (k) was revised as: “ ‘(k) Prints and pictorial illustra-
tions including prints or labels used for articles of merchandise.’” Act of July 31, 1939, Pub.
L. No. 76-244, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 53 Stat. 1142.
41. Copyright Limitations on Sound Recordings, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391
(1971).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
43. Software Copyright Act of Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028.
44. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089, 5133 (1990).
45. See STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE CON-
FERENCE ON COPYRIGHT (May 31-June 2, 1905), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. C, at XV (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976) [herein-
after 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Aside from the Librarian of Congress, the Register of Copy-
rights, and a representative from the U.S. Treasury Department, the following
organizations were present at the Conference on Copyright, held in New York from May
31-June 2, 1905: The American (Authors’) Copyright League, The American Bar Associa-
tion, The American Dramatists Club, The American Institute of Architects, The Library
Association, The American Newspaper Publishers’ Association, The American Publishers’
Copyright League, The Architectural League of America, The Association of American
Directory Publishers, The International Typographical Union, The Music Publishers Asso-
ciation, The National Academy of Design, The National Association of Photo Engravers,
The National Educational Association, The National Institute of Arts and Letters, The Na-
tional Sculpture Society, The Newspaper Artists’ Association, The Periodical Publishers’
Association, The Photographers’ Copyright League, The Print Publisher’s Association of
America, The Society of American Artists, The Print Publishers’ Association of America,
The Society of American Artists, The Sphinx Club and Association of Advertisers, The As-
sociation of Theater Managers of Greater New York, and The Manuscript Society. Id.
The same group, with the addition of a few more organizations, appeared again at the
Librarian of Congress’s Conference in November 1905. The participant lists were grouped
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order to encourage participation by the organizations, the first meet-
ing regarding draft bills for the 1909 Act took place in New York,
where the major guilds and associations were located, instead of the
home of the Copyright Office in Washington D.C. The guilds also at-
tended congressional hearings to represent the interests of their
constituencies.46
During preparatory meetings and congressional hearings, the dis-
cussion about the definition of “author” transformed into a discussion
about the categories of copyrightable subject matter.47 In the 1905
meeting, legislative drafters proposed a definition of author that sim-
ply listed practitioners of various cultural works.48 This proposal shows
according to professional categories and included: authors; dramatists and playwrights; art-
ists: painters, sculptors, architects; composers; publishers; publishers of newspapers and
magazines; publishers of artistic reproductions: lithographers, photographers; publishers
of music; printers; educational institutions; public libraries; miscellaneous; and lawyers.
STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON
COPYRIGHT (Nov. 1-4, 1905), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT
pt. D, at V-VI (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976) [hereinafter 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. The participant lists of the third session, held in March 1906, followed the same
grouping of copyright interests. STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE THIRD
SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT (Mar. 13-16, 1906), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. E, at V-IX (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman
eds., 1976) [hereinafter 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
In 1961, when the Meeting on General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law convened,
various groups with interests in copyright law similarly gathered in Washington D.C. See
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 2:
DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION ON THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (Comm. Print 1963). New interest groups included
several scientist organizations, and newly developed industries, such as motion pictures
and national broadcasting. The participant representing libraries was with a special focus
on fair use in photocopying. Id. at 1-2. Among the newly invited participants were more
government agencies such as the National Science Foundation, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, U.S. Information Agency, Small Business Administration, Govern-
ment Printing Office, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Customs, Department of Justice, Department of State (International
Business Practice Division), and Department of Defense (Naval Research). Id. at 1-4. There
were also more lawyers in attendance, representing the American Bar Association, law
firms, or other participating organizations. Id. at 1-4.
46. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R.
6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094,
1150, 1196, 1200 (1965) (testimonies of Don White, Executive Vice President, National
Audio-Visual Association, Inc.; Robert F. Newman, President, Eye Gate Productions, Inc.;
Ellsworth C. Dent, Senior Vice President, Coronet Instructional Films; Larston D. Farrar,
Farrar Publishing Co.; S. A. Russell, President, Russell & Russell, Inc.; Hayward Cirker,
President, Dover Publications, Inc.).
47. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45, pt. D, at 144-46.
48. Id. pt. D, at 144. Richard R. Bowker, representing the American (Authors’) Copy-
right League, asked Thorvald Solberg, the Register of Copyrights, to read the detailed and
lengthy definition:
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that the definition of an author was often diverted to further discus-
sions on the copyrightability of a particular type of professional practi-
tioner’s product.49 Hence, whether a work counted as a copyrightable
writing often led to long and contentious debates between different
professional organizations.
For example, in the second session of the Conference on Copy-
right in 1905,50 Beverly Smith, a representative of lithographers and
the Reproductive Arts Copyright League, objected to the copyright-
ability of artistic works and insisted on limiting the interpretation of
“writings” to its literal meaning.51 Smith was adamant in defending
the lithographers’ interests, which meant to keep their source mate-
rial, pictorial works, freely exploitable.52 Smith’s argument for a co-
herent interpretation of law that strictly abided by the literal meaning
of the terminology was intended to serve the private interests of one
particular group of practitioners. Smith’s persistent objections during
the meeting built up such a contention that the presiding Librarian of
Congress, Herbert Putnam, intervened by reminding the participants
“Author” as used in this act means the writer of any literary work, the writer or
speaker of any oration, lecture, or other spoken address, a dramatist or musical
composer, a painter or sculptor or the artist of any other [original] work of art,
including drawings, models and architectural designs, the maker of a photo-
graphic negative, engraving, or other secondary work of art involving original
interpretation or distinctive artistic skill, a cartographer, the compiler of compila-
tions or collections, the editor of a distinctive edition, the writer of annotations or
additions, the maker of an abridgement, arrangement, dramatization, translation,
or other version lawfully made, the conductors of a periodical, the joint authors
of a collaborative work, a corporate body with respect to the publications of such
corporation, and a person or persons at whose instance and expense a composite
work is produced. In the case of an anonymous or pseudonymous work the pub-
lisher presenting the work for copyright entry, and whose imprint appears on the
deposited copy, shall be deemed prima facie the assign of the author.
Id.
49. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45, pt. C, at 45 (statement of Herbert Put-
nam, the Librarian of Congress) (“Shall we pass to the question of the subject-matter of
copyright . . . ? The Constitution, just as it provides for the class of persons in no way except
by stating authors, so provides for the subject-matter in no way except by mentioning writ-
ings.”). Similarly, the most frequently used definition of the nature of authorship by the
courts regarded it as involving “‘originating, making, producing, as the inventive or master
mind, the thing which is to be protected, whether it be a drawing, or a painting, or a
photograph.’” SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS &
COPYRIGHTS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY NO. 3, at 86 (Comm.
Print 1960) (quoting Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B.D. 627, 635 (1883)).
50. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45, pt. D. This round of conference was held in
New York in order to be closer to the attendees, many of them representing professional
groups and industry based in the region. See id.
51. Id. pt. D, at 197-98 (“instead of ‘works’, put ‘literary productions’”).
52. See id.
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of the purpose of the discussion.53 Aside from asking each interest
group to be considerate of the other viewpoints represented in the
room,54 Putnam stressed that while users have a right to ask for the
new provisions to be definite, “the bill must be approached from the
point of view of the interest which is to be protected in the use of the
material, and not primarily from point of view of the interest which
seeks to appropriate . . . that subject matter.”55 Putnam implied that
the interest which copyright law intends to protect is that of those who
produce writings and works, not of those who merely use them.
The implementation of the 1909 Copyright Act did not settle the
definition of “writings.” In 1956, when the Copyright Office was pre-
paring for the second general revision of copyright law, it studied the
meaning of “writings,” among other topics.56 The Derenberg Study
traced the development of U.S. copyright law, finding that while the
constitutional language is unclear about whether protection was ex-
clusively limited to writings,57 the term can be broadly construed as
anything that promotes the progress of science and the useful arts.58
Aside from the progress the Constitution seeks to promote, an-
other important factor attributing to the previous expansion of copy-
rightable subject matter was copyright law’s desire “to protect the
commercial value of the productive effort of the individual’s mind.”59
This view transforms the purpose of copyright from a general, idealist
goal of progress, to the materialist notion that, regardless of the re-
sults of the amount of intellectual effort, all works receive property
protection under copyright law simply because certain financial inter-
ests are at stake.60 For example, photographs and negatives were pro-
tected by the 1865 Amendment, during a time when “the commercial
53. Id. pt. D, at 198-200 (“The project before us—the Copyright Office—is to draft a
bill for the consideration of the legislative committee, and this project was in effect to
attempt to get together the interests that were practically concerned with the improvement
of the present law, and to get an agreement among them.”).
54. Id. pt. D, at 199 (“[E]ach interest has to consider that there are other interests
represented here, and what is due to them. . . . It is with reference to the protection of
certain interests that the copyright law, as we understand it, is to be drawn, and not prima-
rily for the convenience of other interests that may be concerned to use the subject-
matter.”).
55. Id. pt. D, at 200.
56. Note, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1263 (1956) [hereinafter Derenberg Study].
57. Id. at 1264-68.
58. Id. at 1269.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 1273 (“[T]he thought was not whether the particular object could be consti-
tutionally protected but whether it needed protection because of the progress of its com-
mercial development.”).
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value of photography[ ] [was discovered] through the famous civil war
pictures taken by Mathew Brady.”61 This materialist view further ex-
panded during the discussion of motion pictures, where large invest-
ments are required for production, yet the commercial value of the
movies might be unpredictable.62 Protection for motion pictures was
recommended because the money invested by the motion picture in-
dustry had become “‘so great and the property rights so valuable
that . . . the . . . law ought . . . to give them distinct and definite
recognition and protection.’”63
Similar arguments for broadening copyright protection were also
successful in the courtroom. For example, in Bleistein v. Donaldson,64 in
order to recognize the financial interest in a pictorial advertisement of
a circus, the U.S. Supreme Court further relaxed the standards for
copyrightability.65 Considering the background of the first copyright
law in England, which also formed around the interests of commercial
printers,66 the development of U.S. copyright law arguably uncovers a
more truthful motive towards profits of the copyright system rather
than simply promoting progress.
Two issues that arise related to copyrightable subject matter are
the manner in which a work is fixed, and the way an expression can be
perceived, stored, and retrieved. The 1909 Act did not include pho-
norecords67 as a protectable subject matter, and the Copyright Office
refused to register copyrights for phonorecords because “all of the
subjects enumerated convey intellectual conceptions visually.”68 Con-
versely, proponents for allowing copyrights for phonorecords claimed
61. Id. at 1270.
62. Id. at 1274.
63. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 756, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912)).
64. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
65. Id. at 251-52.
Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value—it
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value—and
the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt. It is an ultimate fact for
the moment, whatever may be our hopes for a change. That these pictures had
their worth and their success is sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce
them without regard to the plaintiffs’ rights.
Id. at 252.
66. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 139-40 (1968)
(chapter 6); see also infra Part II.A.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“‘Phonorecords’ are material objects in which sounds,
other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.”).
68. Derenberg Study, supra note 56, at 1273 (emphasis added).
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that sound recordings are not only important for documenting per-
formances, but have the same value as “writings.”69 Sound recordings
serve as transcriptions for cultural practices such as the singing of folk
songs, which are delivered predominantly orally.70 They may preserve
the unique subtleties of orally delivered works better than writing
down lyrics. With the development of new technologies,71 it was sug-
gested that “fixation” should be defined as containing the expression
in a form that can be reproduced.72 Upon conclusion of the debates,
§ 102 of the 1976 Act adopted language that accounted for future
technological developments: “Copyright protection subsists . . . in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.”73 As long as a work can be re-
trieved, the statute does not require fixation to be in a particular
form.74
Protection for sound recordings codified by the 1976 Copyright
Act75 did not merely come as a response to technological develop-
69. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVI-
SION, PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 73 (Comm. Print 1964) (statement of William Lichtenwanger,
Library of Congress) (“[I]n addition to its value as a performance, a sound recording has
value as a writing, under the constitutional meaning. In the case of folk songs, for instance,
it may be the only writing that exists.”).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 47 (statement of John Schulman) (discussing the uncertainty surround-
ing the form in which information stored in electronic devices can be “visually or aurally
perceived”).
72. Id. (statement of John Schulman) (“[W]hen a work is fixed, not necessarily in
‘tangible’ form—‘tangible’ indicates something material—but in a form from which it can
be reproduced, we have the essential of a copyrightable work.”). Schulman also suggested
that, in light of future technological developments, the definition should be broader. Id.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE REGISTER OF COPY-
RIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISIONS OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 4
(Comm. Print 1965).
74. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISIONS OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 4 (Comm. Print 1965) (“The manner or
medium of fixation is irrelevant as long as it is tangible enough for the work to be per-
ceived or made perceptible to the human senses, directly or with the aid of any machine or
device ‘now known or later developed.’”).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2012); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE REGISTER OF COPY-
RIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISIONS OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 5
(Comm. Print 1965) (“Under the definition of ‘including’ . . . this listing is ‘illustrative and
not limitive’ . . . [and] is intended . . . to add the new category of ‘sound recordings.’”).
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ment and the potential for an increase in unauthorized duplications.
Rather, responsibility for this addition is largely attributed to an ex-
tended campaign by performing artists and recording engineers—two
groups of practitioners whom copyright law had previously not consid-
ered authors.76
In 1965, the Copyright Office first introduced sound recordings
as a copyrightable subject matter, but left open the question of
whether the performers, record producers, or both, may claim author-
ship and ownership in a work.77 Register Abraham Kaminstein, and
his successor Barbara Ringer, two important figures in the second gen-
eral copyright revision of the twentieth century, expressly supported
the proposition that the contributions of the performing artists and
record producers represented true authorship, and are just as entitled
to copyright protection as motion picture producers and photogra-
phers.78 The only differences seen between the types of authors are
the basic materials and technologies each handle in order to make
their respective works. During the congressional hearings for the
Sound Recording Act of 1971 (“1971 Bill”), Ringer reiterated Kamin-
stein’s statement previously delivered at a congressional hearing in
1965, arguing that recorded performances are “‘writings of an author’
in the constitutional sense” and are copyrightable.79 Ringer further
stated that not only did the Copyright Office and the Library of Con-
76. See infra notes 94-125 (discussing the congressional debates where performing and
recording artists argued for authorship status under copyright law for the protection of
sound recordings).
77. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISIONS OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 5 (Comm. Print 1965) (“[W]hile one of the
major innovations of the bill is to make sound recordings copyrightable as works in them-
selves, the bill leaves open the question of whether the performers whose performance has
been fixed on the recording, the record producer who fixed the sounds, or both of them,
may claim authorship of the work and ownership of the copyright.”).
78. Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and H.R. 6928 Before Sub-
comm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1971).
79. Id. at 13 (statement of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyright).
Let me say plainly there is no doubt in my mind that recorded performances
represent the “writings of an author” in the constitutional sense, and are as fully
creative and worthy of copyright protection as translations, arrangements, or any
other class of derivative works. I also believe that the contributions of the record
producer to a great many sound recordings also represent true “authorship” and
are just as entitled to protection as motion pictures and photographs. No one
should be misled by the fact that in these cases the author expresses himself
through sounds rather than words, pictures, or movements of the body. There is a
great deal of case law in this field, and it is in full support of the principles em-
bodied in section 112.
 Id. at 11.
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gress unconditionally endorse the 1971 Bill,80 but several courts also
supported granting copyright protection for sound recordings.81
Ringer suggested that the decision to confer copyrights for perform-
ers and record producers of sound recordings was not a legal issue,
but rather the question should be decided as a matter of policy.82
The congressional record is unclear whether “record producers”
at this time referred to sound recording engineers or record compa-
nies. During the congressional hearing for the 1971 Bill, Ringer dis-
puted that record producers were nonauthors.83 She argued that
these practitioners were placed in an “area where creative effort of a
rather high level of a sophistication and value is going unprotected
under the Federal law.”84 Her position suggests that record producers
included the sound engineers or technicians that possess the skills re-
quired to handle the relevant technologies and exercise high level of
control in recording sounds. However, Ringer refers to record compa-
nies—the employers of the sound engineers—as record producers.
She reasoned that the company’s interests should be protected be-
cause of their capital investments in the works.85
Another commentator shared this idea and viewed preserving the
economic health of the music industry as the main goal of the legisla-
tion.86 Copyright protection would benefit the “legitimate record
manufacturer” who “produces his records at considerable expense, in-
cluding payments to performers, arrangers, engineers, technicians,
and publishers, as well as promotional expenditures.”87 The House
Committee on the Judiciary (“the Committee”) Report recognized
that authorship of sound recordings could be attributed to perform-
ers and record producers for “setting up the recording session, captur-
ing and electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and
editing them to make the final sound recording.”88 On the other
80. Id. at 12.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id. (“[I]f there are arguments, they are questions of policy and impact on the
economy, rather than of basic legal eligibility.”).
83. Id. at 22.
84. Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and H.R. 6928 Before Sub-
comm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971).
85. Id. at 21 (statement of Barbara Ringer) (“Record producers finance the huge area
of stuff they release that does not represent hits from the profits they get from the hit
records. If people can come in and skim off these profits, the public is sure to suffer.”).
86. Melvin L Halpern, The Sound Recording Act of 1971: An End to Piracy on the High
© ’s?, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 964, 946-65 (1971).
87. Id. at 964.
88. Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and H.R. 6928 Before Sub-
comm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1971).
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hand, when addressing the reason behind the legislation, the Com-
mittee Report was concerned about the loss of income for performers
and manufacturers.89 Although sound recordings received limited
protection,90 the additions in the 1971 Sound Recording Copyright
Act nevertheless expanded copyright authorship to cover new groups
of professional practitioners associated with the new subject matter.91
It was not until the 1976 Copyright Act that sound recordings
became fully recognized as a copyrightable subject matter, upon
which performers and record producers could enjoy the full array of
exclusive rights as authors protected under copyright law.92 The con-
gressional debates leading to the passage of the 1976 Act are reminis-
cent of the lithographers’ objections to the copyrightability of
pictorial works in the beginning of the twentieth century.93 Funda-
mentally, the dispute surrounded the distribution problems arising
when property rights are granted to new categories of works. Prior to
the 1976 Act, broadcasters and jukebox manufacturers advocated
against the copyrightability of sound recordings.94 They were con-
cerned that protecting sound recordings would increase the cost of
business if they were required to pay royalties for playing recorded
music.95 Defending their interests, they argued that writings, as re-
ferred to in the Constitution, could not be so broadly interpreted as to
cover performances of sound recordings.96 Performing artists and re-
89. H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
90. See Sound Recordings Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, (a) 85 Stat. 391 (“[T]he
exclusive right of the owner of a copyright in a sound recording to reproduce it is limited
to the right to duplicate the sound recording in a tangible form that directly or indirectly
recaptures the actual sounds fixed in the recording.”).
91. See id.
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2012).
93. See supra notes 51-52.
94. See infra notes 105-16.
95. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
414-15 (1976) (statement of Parry S. Patterson, Rock-Ola Manufacturing Corp., The See-
Burg, Inc., and Rowe International, Inc.) (opposing the establishment of performing art-
ists’ royalties). “It must be noted that the jukebox industry has never before been subjected
to copyright performance royalties. Thus, any new royalty will impact severely upon the
industry, and will necessitate economic readjustments throughout the industry.” Id. at 420.
96. See id. at 1385 (statement of the National Broadcasting Co., Inc.) (“The Constitu-
tional purpose of copyright is to protect the ‘writings’ of ‘Authors’. Requiring such pay-
ments to performers will neither encourage them to be ‘Authors’ nor result in their
creating new ‘writings’. This is not what the Constitutional copyright mandate was in-
tended to achieve.”).
The Committee [on the Judiciary] must work within the constraints imposed by
the limited grant of authority conferred by Article 1. See. 8, cl. 8 of the Constitu-
tion . . . . The language, purpose and history of this clause demonstrate that it is
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cord manufactures legitimized the claim for protection by emphasiz-
ing their creative contributions to each recording.97
A representative for the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) argued that a sound engineer’s techniques largely
determine the quality of work.98 Additionally, a representative for a
performing artists’ organization characterized their claim for copy-
right protection as a struggle lasting for approximately four decades.99
He claimed that prior attempts for protection failed on account of (1)
the inability to crystallize thoughts on the subject matter; (2) there
was no foreseen solution to reconcile the conflicting interests within
the field; and (3) there were influential “concerted oppositions” to
their position.100 He differentiated the present situation from the
prior failures by stating that the performing artists gradually resolved
their earlier disagreement with the music industry101 and garnered
support from various players including the Copyright Office,102 as well
not a license to confer copyright or patent monopolies on any group who might
appear deserving of economic reward . . . . [A]n attempt to grant such a monop-
oly to performers and record manufacturers poses very real constitutional
problems.
Id. at 1389 (statement of Perry S. Patterson).
97. See id. at 1313 (statement of Stanley M. Gortikov, President, Recording Industry
Association of America, Inc. (RIAA)) (“The performer’s interpretation of a tune is crucial
to its success, and is no less a contribution to the recorded product than is the composer’s
original lyrics and score.”).
98. Id. at 1315 (statement of Stanley M. Gortikov (RIAA)) (“A recording company
makes a two-fold contribution to a recording: the technical manner in which it records a
piece of music, and the financial risk it undertakes in producing the recording. The quality
of a recording and its appeal to listeners is very much affected by the way the recording was
made: the type of recording equipment and studio facilities used, the electronic effects and
recording techniques employed, and the character of the song arrangement and back-
ground music selected. As recording techniques have become more sophisticated and as
experimentation with electronic effects has grown, the creative contribution of recording
companies to their products has increased dramatically, beyond simply the fidelity of a
recording.”).
99. Id. at 1301 (statement of Sanford Wolff, chief executive of the American Federa-
tion of Television and Radio Artists (“AFL-CIO”)) (recounting the history of this struggle
starting in 1940 and taking place in both Congress and the Copyright Office).
100. Id.
101. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
1301 (1976) (statement of Sanford Wolff, chief executive of the AFL-CIO) (“[W]e now
have total agreement between the performing artists and the recording industry.”).
102. Id.
I should say on this point that I believe very strongly that sound recordings and
the performances incorporated in them are creative works, that they are the writ-
ings of an author, and that they are subject to copyright protection under the
Constitution. There is no doubt about this in my mind and I believe that your
action in passing legislation that recognizes sound recordings as copyrightable
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as the National Endowment for the Arts—a federal agency that gives
monetary grants to artists.103 The performing artists, through union
representation, solved potential conflicts within the music industry by
agreeing on a scheme that divided the royalties evenly among the
performers.104
The performing artists assessed that the remaining opposition
mainly came from broadcasters—“a powerful combination of com-
mercial entrepreneurs enjoying public gifts of air-wave monopolies
and prospering enormously on the uncompensated talents of our
members.”105 Performing artists characterized the broadcasters’ prac-
tice as exploitative because broadcasters previously employed musi-
cians and singers as full-time staff to produce programs, but since had
fired those people and used recorded music without paying royal-
ties.106 The music industry, represented by the RIAA, criticized the
broadcasters for having a double standard; pursuing payments from
cable television for the use of broadcasters’ copyrighted programs,
while simultaneously opposing performing artists’ claims to perform-
ance rights.107
Performing artists and the music industry stressed that because
Congress has interpreted writings liberally,108 sound recordings
should be considered protectable subject matter, and both the per-
and protects them against piracy is consistent with that view. It is not whether they
should be protected but how they should be protected, whether protection
should go beyond piracy to include the payment of royalty for performances by
various media. In principle, I support that, too.
Id. at 113 (statement of Barbara Ringer).
103. Id. at 1301.
Undoubtedly, it is a performing artist’s personal rendition that brings to “life” the
work of music composers and lyricists; and, a record producer’s ability to cre-
atively capture, electronically process, compile, and edit sounds that enables
broadcasters to utilize recording artists’ unique performances again and again to
fill their commercially available time.
Id. at 1382 (statement of the National Endowment for the Arts).
104. Id. at 1302 (“To put the phony argument to rest, I am pleased to advise you that
the two performing unions have reached a firm agreement under which all performers will
share equally in the royalties.”).
105. Id. at 1299.
106. Id. at 1302. “Many vocalists and musicians are not sustained by royalties from re-
cord sales, and their opportunities for live performances have been sharply curtailed by the
use of pre-recorded music by broadcasters.” Id. at 1313.
107. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess.1305 (1976) (statement of Stanley M. Gortikov, President, RIAA) (“When it is in their
economic interest, the broadcasters support the principle of rewarding creators. When it is
not in their economic interest, the broadcasters oppose it.”).
108. Id. at 1310.
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formers and record producers should be regarded as authors who
make “original intellectual creations.”109 Barbara Ringer, then the
Register of Copyrights, compared performing artists’ contributions to
those of a translator of a book, and record producers’ contributions to
motion picture producers’ adaptations of a play or novel into a
movie.110 While the performance of a work may contribute more di-
rectly to the commercial success of a recording, only the composers,
not the performers, benefit from the performance royalties paid by
broadcasters.111 Also, in various music genres such as jazz, classical,
and popular music, musicians and singers constantly make original
interpretations and do not always stick to the scores of the musical
composition.112 Some opponents did not refute that sound recordings
Copyright protection has never been limited to the “Writings” of “Authors” in the
literal words of the Constitution. To the contrary, Congress has granted a copy-
right to a wide variety of works embodying creative or intellectual effort, includ-
ing such “Writings” as musical compositions, maps, works of art, drawings or
plastic works of a scientific or technical character, photographs, motion pictures,
printed and pictorial illustrations, merchandise labels, and so on.
Id.
109. Id. at 1318.
“Records are ‘writings’ and performers can be regarded as ‘authors’ since their
contributions amount to original intellectual creations. The committee, likewise,
finds that record manufacturers may be regarded as ‘authors’ since their contri-
bution to the making of a record constitutes original intellectual creations. The
committee endorses the conclusion of the Copyright Office that sound record-
ings ‘are just as entitled to protection as motion pictures and photographs.’”
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-983, at 140 (1974)).
110. Id.
Performing artists contribute original, creative authorship to sound recordings in
the same way that the translator of a book creates an independently copyrightable
work of authorship. Record producers similarly create an independently copy-
rightable work of authorship in the same way that a motion picture producer
creates a cinematographic version of a play or novel. In my opinion, the contribu-
tions of both performers and record producers are clearly the ‘writings of an
author’ in the constitutional sense, and are as fully worthy of protection as any of
the many different kinds of ‘derivative works’ accorded protection under the Fed-
eral copyright statute.
Id. (quoting Barbara Ringer).
111. Id. at 1314 (“[I]ronically, the performer who makes a composer’s tune into a hit,
and earns that composer much compensation in the form of mechanical royalties and
performance royalties, shares in none of the performance royalties himself.”).
112. Id. at 1313 (statement of Stanley Gortikov, President, RIAA) (“The highly talented
jazz musician’s original interpretation of a musical composition is often far removed from
the original tune set down in lines of notes of the copyrighted work. In classical music, too,
there can be considerable variation in the interpretation of a piece. As the Director of the
Boston Symphony Orchestra stated, ‘Improvisation is one of the earmarks of the per-
former in music. . . . You’re engaged in a creative act whenever you interpret a score. If the
performer and the artists were not important, then one recording of Beethoven’s Ninth
would be sufficient for everyone for all time. . . .’ The role of the artist can be even greater
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were writings, but claimed that the 1971 Sound Recording Act pro-
vided adequate protection for the performers’ integrity, and that per-
formers and record producers were already compensated through
indirect means.113
The jukebox industry asserted a narrow interpretation of author
and writings. They rejected the record producers’ claims for lack of
aesthetic contribution, and objected to the performers’ claims not be-
cause their contributions lacked originality, but because the constitu-
tional Copyright Clause meant to exclude performers as a category.114
A representative for the jukebox manufacturers acknowledged that
the constitutional language could be adapted to “concepts of author-
ship and creativity that did not exist when the Constitution was
drafted.”115 But the representative noted that performers existed at
the time of the Constitution, thus the decision to leave performers
unprotected was intentional.116
Theodore Bikel, President of the Actors’ Equity Association,
stated that although performers existed during the drafting of the
Constitution, new technologies changed the nature of the performing
business.117 Previously, a performer’s “art, because it could not, then,
be reduced to a tangible form, could not be stolen, abused, distorted,
or exploited by others.”118 But now the nature of “the performer’s
creation is no longer ephemeral; it has become something tangible
and durable and it may be repeated exactly as originally rendered
over and over again and can even outlive the performer who
with popular music. Here it is often the artist’s performance as much as—or more than—
the composer’s tune that makes the recording attractive to both record buyers and radio
audiences.”).
113. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
1364 (1976) (statement of Vincent T. Wasilewski, President, National Association of
Broadcasters).
114. Id. at 1389-90.
115. Id. at 1390.
116. Id.
It will be argued that changing times have created concepts of authorship and
creativity that did not exist when the Constitution was drafted, and that the Con-
stitution must be interpreted to reflect that fact. Admittedly, a capacity for growth
must be read into the Copyright Clause. In many instances this argument may
have merit, but not in the case of performers as defined in the Scott Amend-
ment . . . . There were plenty of performers, i.e., actors, musicians, singers, etc.,
around at the time the Constitution was adopted and it is not conceivable they
were regarded as authors in the constitutional sense.
Id. (statement of Perry S. Patterson, representing jukebox manufacturers).
117. Id. at 1352 (statement of Theo Bikel, President, Actors’ Equity Association).
118. Id.
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originated it.”119 Thus, if performers could not take control of record-
ings, the development of new technologies only makes their position
more vulnerable within the industry.
Congress eventually expanded the meaning of “writings of an au-
thor” to cover sound recordings in the 1976 Copyright Act.120 The
author of sound recordings, Congress held, can be the performers
and the record producer.121 But where the record producer’s contri-
bution is minimal, only the performers will be regarded as authors.122
If the recording involves no performers, such as recording sounds
from nature, only the record producers’ contribution is copyright-
able.123 Under the 1976 Act, the author of a sound recording has the
exclusive rights to reproduce the sound recording in copies or pho-
norecords, prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted sound
recording, and distribute copies or phonorecords of the sound re-
cording to the public.124 However, authors of sound recordings do
not have public performance rights and cannot collect royalties when
the recordings are broadcast.125
While sound recordings became a separate category of subject
matter, a conceptual distinction was made to reinforce the difference
between a sound recording and the underlying musical composi-
tion.126 Although improvisation is an important part of performance,
and performing artists can deviate from the tunes set in a music com-
119. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
1352 (1976).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2012).
“Sound recordings” are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
121. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 15.
125. See Shourin Sen, The Denial of a General Performance Right in Sound Recordings: A
Policy That Facilitates Our Democratic Civil Society?, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 234 (2007); see
also 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 106(6) (2012) (granting a full public performance right for au-
thors of “musical works” but only a partial public performance right for authors of “sound
recordings”); 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2012) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in
a sound recording . . . do not include any right of performance under § 106(4).”).
126. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
113 (1976) (statement of Barbara Ringer) (“I draw a distinction at this point between the
music on the record and the recording itself.”).
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position, the law treats composers and performers as two different cat-
egories of professional practitioners by strictly distinguishing the
copyright of a sound recording from the copyright of the underlying
musical composition; each practitioner has corresponding works of
authorship.127
The history of subject matter expansion since the early twentieth
century highlights the heavy involvement of professional organiza-
tions in the legislative process. The professional organizations that
lobbied for the inclusion of new subject matters typically argued that
their members made valuable contributions to society by offering
products of high quality that lay people were unable or unlikely to
achieve, yet desire to consume.128 To support the inclusion of a new
subject matter, analogies were made between the practitioners of a
newly purported subject matter and those that were already included
in the copyright system.129 In the past, technological limitations or
restrictive market environments may have impeded broad dissemina-
tion of authors’ works. As such conditions ceased to exist, professional
practitioners demanded that their contributions to societal progress
could not continue to be undervalued.130 They claimed the need for
copyright protection in order to prevent exploitation, and to ensure
an environment where quality works continue to be produced.131 In-
terests of various professional organizations may conflict when a new
copyright subject matter is proposed. However, regardless of the side
taken on a particular subject matter, all groups tend to assert that pro-
127. See Anne Barron, Introduction: Harmony or Dissonance? Copyright Concepts and Musical
Practice, 15 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 25, 36 (2006).
128. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1092 (1965)
(distinguishing amateur performances from the professionally produced).
129. See supra text accompanying note 110.
130. See Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 37 on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 821-22 (1967)
(testimony of Erich Leinsdorf, Music Director, Boston Symphony Orchestra) (explaining
the artistic contribution of performers, how they were harmed by radio stations which ex-
ploited their recordings without compensation and by consumers who were able to record
performances broadcast via airwave, and urging Congress to grant royalty rights to
performers).
131. See id. at 840 (testimony of Don White, National Audiovisual Association Inc.)
(pleading against exemptions for educational uses, or the sincere but shortsighted requests
from educations would result in shortage of quality teaching materials); id. at 510-12 (state-
ment of Norman Rocusin, Vice President and General Manager RCA Victor Record Divi-
sion of Radio Corp. of America) (asking Congress to grant copyright to sound recordings,
or the record companies would curtail the investment in record production and the con-
sumers would suffer).
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fessionals produce higher quality work than lay people, and therefore
are more deserving of copyright protection.132
While understanding that different groups of practitioners can
have conflicting interests, the Copyright Office responded to a mar-
ket-oriented concept of property rights when faced with demands to
include new copyrightable subject matters. The Copyright Office lib-
erally construes the definition of copyrightable subject matter, and
generally supports its expansion.133
The definition of author and writings developed during the past
legislative processes was the result of political negotiation and persua-
sion between the colliding interests of professional organizations.
These professional groups claimed to speak on behalf of the public
and aimed to advance the public interest,134 but, in reality, the voice
of the public was largely missing. Attempts to include a new subject
matter in a new bill are likely to fail if it would cause the “displeasure
of various interest groups.”135 This notion is affirmed by the legislative
history of the sound recordings copyright, where conflicting interests
previously squashed the performing artists’ plea, and the repeated re-
jections were attributed to the committee’s failure to crystallize its
132. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R.
6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1092
(1965) (testimony of Ellsworth C. Dent, senior vice president, Coronet Instructional Films)
(emphasizing that their films were professionally produced and participated in by mem-
bers of the actors guild, and that full copyright protection is important for the industry to
continue similar business practices and to ensure the supply of quality education films); id.
at 1195 (testimony of George Frost, representing the Professional Photographers of
America, underlining the artistic value of works by professional photographers) (noting
that formalities requirements in the 1909 Act caused difficulties for photographers to ob-
tain copyright).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 36-44 (stating the numerous occasions on
which the definition of copyrightable subject matter was expanded).
134. See, e.g., Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 37 on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 503-04 (1967)
(statement of Alan W. Livingston, Capitol Records) (arguing that granting record compa-
nies and performers the right to collect royalties would increase public interests, because it
would make it financially viable for these practitioners to continue producing quality re-
cordings to be aired); id. at 541-42 (statement of Stan Kenton, National Chairman, Na-
tional Committee For the Recording Arts) (noting that without the right to collect royalties
performers are deprived of a fundamental economic right, and the performance right is
not only fair compensation for recording artists, but would also increase the variety of
music products); id. at 868-71 (statement of the National Broadcasting Co., Inc.) (arguing
that granting performers the right to collect royalties would hurt the public interest be-
cause it would curtail broadcasters’ ability to bring the recorded performance to the
public).
135. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPY-
RIGHTS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY NO. 3, at 76 (Comm. Print
1960).
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thoughts on this issue.136 When sound recordings were finally in-
cluded, the Committee Reports proclaimed that “sound recordings
are clearly within the scope of the ‘writings of an author.’”137 If sound
recordings could then be clearly considered as writings, the earlier
rejections could only have been the result of extralegal affairs (i.e.,
whether proponents were able to garner enough political good will,
by making concessions to, or deals with, groups having overlapping
economic interests).
II. The Professional/Lay Divide
Modern copyright law is considered a “bargain” between private
and public interests, giving private individuals exclusive ownership of
their works for a limited period of time to increase production and
encourage wide distribution for the public enjoyment.138 Professional
practitioners embrace the exclusive rights afforded under copyright
law, viewing them as justifiable compensation for their expertise.139
Only such monopoly rights allow them to continue their professional
practices, and society benefits from their undertaking. Due to the ex-
tensive discussion of professional excellence, authors protected by
copyright law often are imagined as professional practitioners.140 Part
II explains how legal terminologies serve as a tool for different profes-
sional practitioners to align potentially conflicting interests in order to
fully support the copyright system. Additionally, this Part discusses the
widened divide between the private interests of professional practi-
tioners and the public in copyright law.
136. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
1301 (1976).
137. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976) (emphasis added).
138. See LITMAN, supra note 4, at 78; LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT:
A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 52-53 (1991).
139. See Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 37 on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 540-42 (1967)
(statement of Stan Kenton, National Chairman, National Committee for the Recording
Arts).
140. See supra Part I. See also Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680,
H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1152 (1966) (statement of Larston Farrar, Farrar Publishing Co.) (asserting that
professional writers often receive lower pay than janitors and deserve more because they
are instrumental in progressing the nation’s mental, spiritual, moral, and physical
development).
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A. Copyright Law is for the Public—Persuasion and Expansion
The copyright system was first developed in the United Kingdom
to mitigate conflicts in the book trade.141 In Britain, the Stationers’
Company—a professional guild of book publishers—had long en-
gaged in self-censorship in exchange for monopoly rights.142 In 1694,
upon the expiration of the Licensing Order of 1643, stationers sought
to protect their monopolies against competitors from outside guilds
using a new legal tool.143 While publishers in London only used au-
thors’ rights as a pretext for their own commercial interests, authors
soon adopted the role and function of the promoters of science and
useful arts, and began to demand property ownership as their inher-
ent right.144 The development of early copyright regulatory tech-
niques was contingent upon the particular historical context in
Britain, however, its supporting rhetoric and persuasion gradually
traveled to other societies.
The Federalist Papers attributes the original concept of the Copy-
right Clause in the U.S. Constitution to the original British law,145 and
recognizes the utility of such congressional power: “The public good
fully coincides in both cases [of copyright and patent], with the claims
of individuals.”146 Initially, authors were considered a selective cate-
gory of “Learned Men.”147 As the subject matter of copyright law ex-
panded beyond writings and maps to cover a variety of cultural
activities, more actors, practices, and artifacts were brought under its
protection. These newly admitted authors, often organized as profes-
sional groups, emphasized copyright’s goal of promoting societal pro-
gress.148 By gradually expanding the scope of copyrightable subject
matter, the system included more groups of professional practitioners
141. PATTERSON, supra note 66, at 143.
142. See ALINA NG, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND THE USEFUL ARTS
68-70 (2011).
143. PATTERSON, supra note 66, at 139-42.
144. For example, author Daniel Defoe proclaimed a “right of property created by au-
thors.” ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO
GATES 113-14 (2009). However, the Scottish bookseller Alexander Donaldson denied such
authors had original inherent property in their work and successfully challenged this asser-
tion in Donaldson v. Beckett. Id. at 122-24; see also Donaldson v. Beckett, [1774] 1 Eng. Rep.
837 (H.L.).
145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
146. Id.
147. Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710)
(Gr. Brit.) (“[F]or the Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful
Books.”).
148. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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who subscribe to the manner in which the current copyright system
frames the concept of the human flourishing problem.149 Through
alliance-building, the copyright regime strengthens its capability to re-
cruit various new professional practitioners as authors. Publishers con-
tinue to assume an important role as the distributor—the
intermediary between authors and the public—selecting only infor-
mation deemed worthy of public dissemination. Thus, copyright law
grants professional practitioners, including authors and publishers,
the power and responsibility to represent the interest of the public.
B. “Author” and “Works”—Abstracted Legal Terminologies as
Interest-Aligning Tools
The 1909 Copyright Act included the term “all the writings of an
author”150 to describe the works protected under the Act. The inter-
pretation of author is very flexible, and during the various copyright
subject matter expansions the thought seemed not to be “whether the
particular object could be constitutionally protected but whether it
needed protection because of the progress of its commercial develop-
ment.”151 It was important that the definition of the terms author and
writings remain malleable in order for copyright law to encompass the
various practitioners, practices, and products it now protects. The ab-
stract concepts of authors and writings serve to mitigate the differ-
ences between various professional groups, and help hold the system
together. When Barbara Ringer introduced into Congress the draft
bill of the 1976 Copyright Act, she equated “authors of . . . writings”
with “creators of copyrighted works as we now know them,” brushing
aside any technological development or acknowledgement of the ex-
tended debates over the meaning of the terms.152 In the 1976 Act,
Congress finally codified this liberal interpretation of author and writ-
149. See JULIE COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16 (2012). Julie Cohen uses the capabilities approach developed by
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum to examine copyright law in a networked society. Id. at
15. This approach finds that law and policy should serve the ultimate goal of human flour-
ishing—the fulfillment of human freedom, both the freedom from the absence of re-
straints and the freedom to “access to resources and . . . the availability of a sufficient
variety of real opportunities.” Id.
150. Copyright Act of 1909, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076.
151. See Derenberg Study, supra note 56, at 1273.
152. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
106 (1976) (emphasis added) (“[T]he sole and only beneficiary of the copyright law of the
United States under the Constitution, [are] the authors of the so-called writings. In other
words, the creators of copyrighted works as we now know them.”).
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ings, replacing the term “all the writings of an author” in § 4 of the
1909 Act with “original works of authorship.”153 Congress did this to
“avoid exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in
this field.”154
Congress carefully attempted to avoid restrictive interpretation of
the Act by incorporating broad language into several sections. First,
Congress intentionally left “original works of authorship” undefined
to incorporate the low originality standard established by the
courts.155 Second, the medium used to satisfy the requirement of fixa-
tion can be one “now known or later developed,”156 and fixation is
broadly defined. A work is sufficiently fixed if a work “can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.”157 Finally, in the section listing
copyrightable subject matter, the Act uses the language “include”158
and indicates that the list is “ ‘illustrative and not limitative.’”159
The definitions offered by the Supreme Court also left the Act
open to broad interpretation. The Supreme Court stated that an au-
thor was “‘he to whom anything owes its origin’”160 and held that “the
author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person
who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to
copyright protection.”161 The Court interpreted writings to mean
“physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic
labor.”162 Because the abstracted terms author and work are elastic
and can be applied generally, the expanded copyright system can in-
corporate a variety of activities, regardless of the differences in the
technique and skills involved, material used, process of production,
manner in which it is perceived, and technologies deployed in pro-
duction, storage, reproduction, and distribution. This elasticity allows
courts to consider each work specifically, and therefore avoids alienat-
ing particular groups of practitioners, by admitting a heterogeneous
body of authors.
153. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
154. Id.
155. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976).
160. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
161. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 102).
162. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
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In determining authorship in joint work cases with multiple au-
thors claiming ownership over one work, courts must assess contribu-
tors with different expertise and who are responsible for different
tasks in the production process. The multiple activities necessary to
complete a joint work challenge judges to provide interpretations of
authors and writings that are both abstract and specific.163 This di-
lemma generally causes courts to favor granting ownership rights in
joint work cases to contributors that are professionals in their respec-
tive fields.
C. The Missing Public
Those whose interests are not properly represented by the cur-
rent system are especially critical of the statements heard during con-
gressional hearings, and of the overall legitimacy of the copyright
system.164 While the expansion of protectable subject matter allowed
more practitioner groups to join as authors, thus increasing support
for the law, the copyright system has not persuaded everyone. For ex-
ample, those who feel copyright law fails to allocate resources fairly
are less likely to consider it a moral wrong to infringe on others’ copy-
rights and obtain unauthorized copies of protected works.165 Oppo-
nents of the copyright system might also advocate against consuming
products by companies that pursue aggressive enforcement strate-
gies.166 The broadened reach of the copyright system and the growing
number of authors does not necessarily lead to a less disputed system.
163. See infra Part III.C-D.
164. Peter Drahos, Biotechnology Patents, Market and Morality, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 441, 441 (1999) (explaining that the property right is “the key institution . . . of social
and political morality” as “[i]ts definition affects resource distribution and takes one
straight into issues of social justice”).
165. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can’t “Just Say Yes” to Licens-
ing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 237, 239 (1997) (“People don’t obey laws that they don’t
believe in. It isn’t necessarily that they behave lawlessly, or that they’ll steal whatever they
can steal if they think they can get away with it. . . . If they don’t believe the law says what it
in fact says, though, they won’t obey it.”).
I do not suggest that all those who obtain illegal copies are consciously opposing the copy-
right system. Nevertheless, they can be seen as actors who refuse to accept the rhetoric of
the copyright system emphasizing progress and public/private bargain, and do not con-
sider the price to obtain authorized copies as a fair trade.
166. See, e.g., Jacob Dawid, Why Proprietary Software is Unethical, <CYBERCATALYST.NET>
(Jan. 20, 2013), http://cybercatalyst.net/why-proprietary-software-is-unethical/ (showing
some free software advocates consciously choose not to use proprietary software); Jason
Self, The (Lack) of Cell Phone Freedom, JXSELF.ORG, http://jxself.org/the_lack_of_cell_phone_
freedom.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); Richard Stallman, Why You Should Not Buy Apple
Computer Products, RICHARD STALLMAN PERSONAL SITE, https://stallman.org/apple.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
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Groups of professional practitioners who are not part of the copy-
right system represent potential critics. However, so long as they in-
tend to be included as owners and authors in the copyright system
eventually, they are unlikely to question the framework of and the jus-
tification for this regulatory system. Instead, they tend to echo the
general copyright themes of promoting societal progress, the impor-
tant role of professional practitioners, and question why their valuable
professional contribution to society is denied by this system.167 The
notion of professionals being the driving force to ensure progress and
enhance quality of works is so strong that even the Copyright Office
considers professional practitioners, not the public, as their main
clientele.168
In Register Ringer’s address to Congress regarding the proposed
1976 Act, she stated that authors were the one and only group the
Copyright Office should serve.169 By placing a heavy emphasis on au-
thors, she discounted the public as another stakeholder.170 Ringer’s
argument demonstrated a deep concern for authors’ private interests.
She contrasted the public’s interests with the authors’ and argued that
the former does not have a priority over the latter.171 She lamented
how authors have been “treated shabbily and stingily” and spoke to
advance their interests in Congress.172 Ringer believed that authors
would be unwilling to disseminate their works if there were no copy-
right protection.173 Ringer asserted that the exclusive rights granted
167. See supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
168. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
106 (1976) (statement of Barbara Ringer) (“My feeling as the head of the Copyright Office
is that my responsibility is to one group and one group only, and that is the group that is
identified as the sole and only beneficiary of copyright law . . . authors of the so-called
writings. In other words, the creators of copyrighted works as we now know them.”).
169. Id.
170. See PATTERSON, supra note 138, at 53 (noting that the monopoly granted to the
author under the copyright bargain is conditional because it is more important to promote
learning and to protect the public domain than to protect authors).
171. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
106 (1976) (statement of Barbara Ringer) (“I am also conscious that everyone else besides
the author is a user of the author’s work, and as between users there may be arguments
which are extremely persuasive for reasons unrelated to protection of the author but in
some respects are irrelevant to the essential purpose of the copyright law.”).
172. Id. (“I am profoundly of the belief that authors in this country have been treated
shabbily and stingily from the very beginning of our copyright system.”).
173. See id. at 107.
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to authors “is the ultimate public interest that the Constitution and its
drafters were thinking about.”174
Promoting societal progress has long been cited as the justifica-
tion for the copyright system. Such progress is thought to balance out
the price each member of society is required to pay copyright own-
ers.175 However, during the congressional debates regarding past ex-
pansions of copyrightable subject matter, the public interest often
faded into the background. Instead campaigns concerted by profes-
sional organizations representing the interests of their constituencies
were at the forefront of the hearings. Using the societal progress justi-
fication, these professional groups often couched their claims in the
public interest argument.176 But whether expanding the definition of
copyrightable subject matter would have an inadvertent impact on the
cultural life of the public was seldom discussed. Register Ringer’s dis-
cussion of the public’s role in relation to the authors’ interest in pri-
vate property rights explains why the public was not of concern when
new subject matters were included.177 Authors are scholars, profes-
sionals, and experts, and are seen as the driving force of progress and
human flourishing.178 The public only has a reflective interest as re-
ceivers and consumers, if individual members can afford the copy-
righted works that are disseminated.
In a committee hearing, the scope of the fair use doctrine179 gen-
erated discussion about the public interest—focusing on exemptions
for making copies of protected works, however, not concerning the
preparation of derivative works.180 The discussion appears to imagine
174. Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
178. See Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 37 on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1967) (state-
ment of Elizabeth Janeway, Authors League of America) (expressing support for the bill
and arguing that works contributing to the progress of society have been made by the
individual author); id. at 41 (statement of Herman Wouk, Authors League of America)
(emphasizing that a system of copyright supports the development of free and indepen-
dent artists and intellectuals whose works would then help to define our lives and the
world).
179. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.”).
180. The discussions regarding fair use pertained to photocopying or reproduction of
a copyrighted work. See Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 98
(1976) (statement of Barbara Ringer); id. at 184-92 (statement of Edmon Low, represent-
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the public as a passive user separated from the professional authors
who are the sources of quality products and therefore the rightful
property owners of their works.
During another congressional hearing on fair use and photocopy-
ing, Professor Ralph S. Brown commented that the public is rarely
mentioned in the debate and are categorized as “anybody from whom
another nickel can be milked for copyright owners.”181 Three profes-
sional groups—educators, librarians, and researchers—mediated the
interest of the general public. Educators and librarians have an inter-
est in a broader and clearly-defined fair use concept in order to per-
form their professional services.182 Researchers represent a special
professional group of capable individuals who build their scholarship
on pre-existing literature. One commentator argued that, in this case,
issues of fair use were raised within a “specific, small, limited classes of
people”183 (i.e., researchers) and the “restricted [or] limited material
which they need.”184 This commentator suggested that the Fair Use
Clause should not relax protection for copyrighted works, and should
avoid using broad language by focusing on the user’s specific and lim-
ited purpose and needs.185
ing Six Library Associations); id. at 370-71 (statement of David McCurrach, National
School and Equipment Association).
181. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COM-
MENTS ON THE DRAFT 170 (Comm. Print 1964).
182. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVI-
SION, PART 5: 1964 REVISION WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 98 (Comm. Print 1965)
(statement of Harry N. Rosenfield, Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Revision) (asserting
that a judicially determined fair use doctrine does not provide clear guidance, and that
because the fair use doctrine was developed to manage the rivalry between commercial
competitors it is ill-suited for non-commercial educational uses); Hearings on H.R. 2223
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 185-87 (1976) (statement of Edmon Low, representing
six library associations) (stating that (1) libraries are the repositories and storehouses of
knowledge that serve the public, (2) fair use as a defense does not keep libraries from
being sued, and (3) measures other than the fair use doctrine need to be in place to assure
librarians are free from the threat of litigation when making copies for education and
research).
183. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COM-
MENTS ON THE DRAFT 177 (Comm. Print 1964) (statement of Bella L. Linden).
184. Id. at 178.
185. See id. at 177-78. Linden notes that the intention of the bill was not to “draft a
clause in this bill that opens the door to free use of every type of literary property, and to
every class of individuals that falls within the broad classification of ‘the public.’” Id. at 178.
She argues that such the impact on these special interests and limited needs of a specific
group of people could be solved by adding a tailored limitation to the exclusive rights of
copyright owners. Id.
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In a rare instance, concern for the public interest appeared dur-
ing the hearings for one proposed subject matter expansion—works
made by the federal government.186 Here, the public interest was me-
diated through news journalists and broadcasters.187 As a professional
group, journalists have their own vested interest to argue against the
copyrightability of federal government works. If the federal govern-
ment is granted copyright protection for its published material, jour-
nalists argued, they would not be able to report information from this
material as freely and would be compelled to paraphrase information,
which can distort the truth and mislead the public.188 Unpublished
federal government material should also not receive copyright protec-
tion, or it would provide an incentive for the government to simply
refrain from publishing informative materials.189 The public interest
asserted in the government works context is tailored to the news me-
dia’s ability to provide wide dissemination of reliable information to
engage citizens in a democratic republic.190
While prohibiting copyright in government works was widely em-
braced, the copyrightability of works produced under government
contract or with federal grants was contested during the legislative de-
liberation.191 In the 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights, the
Copyright Office incorporated into the definition of “Government
Publication” the practices of a number of government agencies.192
Government contractors and grant receivers were permitted to secure
the copyright of the resulting work, and the agencies obtained a non-
exclusive license for publication.193 Nevertheless, in 1965, the Office
of Education issued a policy stating the opposite: “Material produced
as a result of any research activity undertaken with any financial assis-
186. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (“Copyright protection under this title is not available
for any work of the United States Government.”).
187. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVI-
SION, PART 5: 1964 REVISION WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS (Comm. Print 1965).
188. Id. at 54 (statement of Douglas Anello, National Association of Broadcasters) (ex-
pressing concern that government would use copyright as a censorship tool by controlling
distribution and interpretation).
189. Id. at 46-47 (statement of Harry Rosenfield).
190. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1465 (1966)
(statement of the American Newspaper Publisher Association (ANPA)) (“This association
takes the position that no person should be permitted to copyright any material where a
substantial part thereof is created by Government employees or with Government funds.”).
ANPA’s position is supported by the National Newspaper Association. Id. at 1464.
191. See id. at 131.
192. Id. at 130-31.
193. Id. at 131.
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tance through contract with or project grant from the Office of Edu-
cation will be placed in the public domain. Materials so released will
be available to conventional outlets of the private sector for their
use.”194
During one congressional deliberation, Professor Melville Nim-
mer stated that although a work produced using government funding
may render it copyrightable, the same rule should apply to federal
government works if the government facilities were used to publish
the work.195 Participants during other revision hearings took a
stronger position in questioning the general copyrightability of gov-
ernment-funded research material.196 Ultimately, Congress limited
the scope of protection for works prepared by government employees.
In the report, Congress clarified, “The bill deliberately avoids making
194. 30 Fed. Reg. 9345, 9408-09 (July 28, 1965).
195. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COM-
MENTS ON THE DRAFT 102 (Comm. Print 1964).
196. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1922-24 (1965)
(statement of Senator Ralph Yaborough) (statement titled “Protection of Public Interest in
Results of Research Paid for by Federal Government”).
The Office of Education has declared that the main thrust of its policy is to assure
competition in the production and dissemination of different versions of curricu-
lar materials. As Deputy Commissioner of Education Henry Loomis stated in a
conference held with representatives of educational organizations after the policy
statement was published: “We want to make this material available to the maxi-
mum number of people, in the shortest time, with a minimum of restrictions.” . . .
I do not mean to say that there would not be instances in which equity would
dictate that a copyright should be allowed for a limited term of years. Nor would I
rule out the possibility of allowing a person to copyright a subsequent publication
drawing on the results of his Government-financed research, so long as all the
information contained therein has already been made public. In this time when
more and more research is being paid for by the Federal Government, we must
be careful to safeguard the public’s right of access to information which it has
paid for.
Id. at 1924.
The original and continuing purpose of this prohibition is to assure maximum
availability and dissemination of informational material prepared by or for the
Government at the expense of the public. My amendment insures that knowledge
developed by contractors and grantees at great public expense shall also be freely
available to the press, to scholars, to private enterprise, and to the public at large.
Since Federal outlays for research now total over $15 billion annually, this matter
is of far-reaching importance.
Id. (statement of Senator Russell B. Long).
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 37 on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 661-63
(1967) (statement of M. B. Schnapper, Editor, Public Affairs Press, co-signed by other jour-
nalists and scholars specializing in journalism and library studies).
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any sort of outright, unqualified prohibition against copyright in
works prepared under Government contract or grant.”197 Congress ac-
knowledged that in certain circumstances, itself or other government
agencies might find that “the need to have a work freely available out-
weighs the need of the private author to secure copyright, [and such
a] problem can be dealt with by [enacting] specific legislation, agency
regulations, or implementing contractual restrictions.”198
The public interests outlined by the journalists and the Copyright
Office for limiting protection of governmental works differ. The jour-
nalists’ concern for the public interest was seen through its fear that
granting protection for government works would impair its ability to
provide information to the public, who are the consumers of profes-
sional journalism.199 However, other participants in the revision hear-
ings viewed the public as taxpayers that directly fund the government,
and such tax revenue indirectly funds research institutions that re-
ceive government grants.200 They viewed that “[w]hen the public pays
for research, the research properly belongs to the public.”201 This ra-
tionale was also implied in a congressional report stating, “The prohi-
bition on copyright protection for United States Government works is
not intended to have any effect on protection of these works
abroad.”202 The debates surrounding the copyrightability of govern-
ment-financed research also focused on whether it was acceptable to
grant protection if it forces the public to pay a “double subsidy.”203
Copyright law’s gradual expansion to cover various categories of
works was the result of the lobbying efforts of professional practition-
ers.204 The definitions of the terms authors and writings became more
abstract and general in order to accommodate assorted practices. The
threshold requirement for originality dropped to a minimum, and the
1976 Copyright Act allows copyright protection to exist in any work as
197. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 59 (1976).
198. Id.
199. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 37 on S. 597 Before the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 629 (1967) (stating that copyright protection would led to censorship by encour-
aging government personnel to withhold information, which would “impair [their] ability
to discharge [their] responsibility to the public”).
200. Id. at 661.
201. Id. at 658 (internal quotation omitted).
202. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 59 (1976).
203. Id. (explaining that one major reason to prohibit copyright protection for govern-
ment works is to avoid requiring the public to pay a “double subsidy” for works produced
using public funds).
204. See supra Part I.
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soon as it is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, which turns
everyone into a potential author.205 Nevertheless, a constructed divide
between the works produced by professionals and the lay public per-
sists, with the former claiming to move society forward through inno-
vation for the benefit of the latter. The Copyright Office has bought
into this logic. Serving as the administrative body as well as the archi-
tect of copyright law, the Copyright Office further deepened the
imagined divide in copyright protection between the private profes-
sional practitioners and the lay public.
III. Professional Authors and the Joint Work Doctrine
Under copyright law, a joint work is defined as “a work prepared
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.”206 “The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in
the work.”207 The simple statutory language fails to reflect the actual
complexity behind the doctrine. Joint work cases are difficult because
(1) they often involve collaboration among people with intimate and
long-term relationships who do not specify the nature of the partner-
ship in written agreements; (2) entering into contracts is not always
appropriate since works often develop organically, and it is difficult to
predetermine the amount of contribution by each collaborator; and
(3) the diversified expertise among collaborators makes it compli-
cated to objectively evaluate the contribution of each person.
Scholars suggest that courts are reluctant to recognize contribu-
tors to a single work as joint authors.208 Courts typically interpret the
joint work clause more strictly than a mere literal interpretation.209
The explanations for the reluctance to award joint authorship in a
copyrighted work contribute to a long-lasting debate about the con-
cept of authorship in copyright law. Some legal scholars, influenced
by the literary criticism developed around the role of the author,210
205. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
206. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
207. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
208. See, e.g., Lape, supra note 20, at 54; Jaszi, supra note 20, at 51.
209. Courts have required not only that joint authors intend to merge contributions,
but also intend that all would be identified as co-authors. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500,
508 (2d Cir. 1991). Another requirement stating that each contribution must be indepen-
dently copyrightable for joint authorship to be awarded is also a narrow interpretation
some courts follow that is not warranted by the statutory reading. See infra Part III.C.
210. See, e.g., Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author (1967) (criticizing the notion that
reading that relies on the author’s identity and biographical background, and argues that
authors do not dominate the meaning of the text, but rather each work is read and inter-
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focus on the legal construction of romantic authorship.211 Copyright
law favors rewarding sole authorship for copyrights because this ro-
manticist image of one who works in solitude and is the only source
from which the resulting work originates, overshadows the unending
methods of contribution a production process may involve.212 Other
scholars argue that the central analytical framework for copyright law
is based on a property theory of economics, which favors a centralized
control of information over a distributed one to enhance efficiency.213
While both the romantic author and owner-author are important con-
cepts to help understand how courts allocate property interests in cop-
yright cases, the professionalism ingrained in copyright law produces
a third image of authorship—expert authors. In joint work cases,
courts privilege expert authors whose professional practices are
strongly connected with the subject matter of the disputed work.
A. The Joint Work Doctrine Until 1976
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, the joint work doctrine was judi-
cially created. In Maurel v. Smith,214 Judge Learned Hand provided an
preted according to how the reader perceives it); Michael Foucault, What is an Author?, in
LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE 124-27 (Donald F. Bouchard ed., Donald F.
Bouchard & Sherry Simon trans., Cornell University Press 1977) (stating that although the
texts of an author are subject to interpretation, the author still serves a discursive func-
tion—as a reference to a certain quality of works associated with his names or as the actual
person to which the text refers). See also MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY
LIFE 167-72 (Steven Rendall trans., University of California Press 1984) (rejecting the idea
that reading is merely a passive activity). He also argues that although a reader does not
take the position of the author, he invents in texts something different from what they
intended, detaches the texts from their origin, and reorganizes pieces of the texts to pro-
duce something unknown in the space that allows for an indefinite plurality of meanings.
Id. at 169. But such productive reading is often only reserved for the professional intellec-
tuals due to a kind of social stratification that recognizes the social elites as authorized
interpreters and common readers’ interpretation as heretical or negligible. Id. at 172.
211. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991
DUKE L.J. 455, 455-59 (1991) (stating that since the eighteenth century the concept “au-
thorship” has been closely associated with the Romantic movement in literature and art,
but it is in fact a social construct, and failure in recognizing this construction may result in
lawyers “embracing the whole complex set of values and associations that attached to the
notion of [romantic authorship]”); see also supra note 21.
212. See Woodmansee, supra note 21, at 291-92.
213. See Lemley, supra note 22, at 874 (suggesting that the romantic authorship idea
should be replaced with the view that current trends in intellectual property law are better
described according to a property-based economic theory).
214. 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff’d, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921). The case involved
three people who contributed to a comic opera “Sweethearts”: Fred de Gresac Maurel, Harry
B. Smith, and Robert B. Smith. Id. at 196-97. Maurel agreed to write scenarios for a comic
opera for Werba & Leuscher, a theatrical managing firm, on the condition that she was
advertised as the author and no changes would be made without her consent. Id. at 197.
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analogy between tangible and intangible property that effectively
treated joint authors as tenants-in-common.215 In the mid-twentieth
century, the Second Circuit broadened the definition of joint
works.216 In 1955, the Second Circuit held that the intention to merge
intellectual efforts into a single work does not have to derive from the
authors, but can also come from assignees.217 The expansion of the
concept of joint authorship was heavily critiqued218 and was eventually
overruled by the 1976 Copyright Act. The 1976 Act clarified that the
intent to produce a joint work must come from authors, not from
assignees.219 Congress also perpetuated prior case law’s treatment of
joint authors as tenants-in-common, confirming the court-made rules
regarding the rights and duties of the co-owners.220
B. Interpretation of “Intent” Under the 1976 Act
The language of the 1976 Act requires joint authors to merely
intend to merge their contributions into a unitary whole.221 Con-
cerned about the Act’s implications on property distribution, the Sec-
ond Circuit requires co-authors to demonstrate a level of intent that is
higher than simply the intent to merge intellectual efforts. For exam-
With Maurel’s permission, the managers asked Harry B. Smith to write the libretto. Id.
Harry later discovered he needed help and engaged his brother Robert to write the lyrics.
Id. Robert B. Smith falsely represented that he and Harry were the sole owners of the
piece, and gave G. Shirmer Inc. the right to publish and copyright the opera. Id.
215. Maurel, 271 F. at 214 (“[T]here is no distinction . . . between literary property and
property of any other description.”).
216. See, e.g., Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 140 F.2d 266,
267 (2d Cir. 1944); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 161 F.2d
406, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1946); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc., v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc.,
221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1955) [hereinafter Shapiro II].
217. Shapiro II, 221 F.2d at 570 (“We feel that the rule of these [joint work] cases, as
extended to the facts of the case at bar, should make the test the consent, by the one who
holds the copyright on the product of the first author, at the time of the collaboration, to
the collaboration by the second author. That is to say that ordinarily we look to the consent
of the first author to see whether or not we have a joint work; when the first author has
assigned away all his rights which he can assign, we look to the intent of the assignee.”).
218. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPY-
RIGHTS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY NO. 12, at 89-92 (Comm.
Print 1960) (Gregory D. Carey, Joint Ownership of Copyrights).
219. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976).
220. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976) (“There is also no need for a specific statu-
tory provision concerning the rights and duties of the co-owners of a work; court-made law
on this point is left undisturbed. Under the bill, as under the present law, co-owners of a
copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each co-owner having an
independent right to use of license the use of a work.”).
221. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Issue 1] EXPOSING PROFESSIONALISM IN U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 95
ple, the court in Childress v. Taylor222 ruled that the “equal sharing of
rights should be reserved for relationships in which all participants
fully intend to be joint authors.”223 However, the Childress court was
reluctant to find that collaborators must intend to hold equal, undi-
vided interests in the work at issue.224 But, some courts read Childress
as requiring parties to intend the legal consequences of joint author-
ship.225 While the Seventh Circuit also follows Childress, and applies
the three factual indicia for finding mutual intent,226 it provides an
interpretation that is generally less stringent and closer to the statu-
tory definition.227 It is unclear how the Second and the Seventh Cir-
cuits produced diverging opinions on the issue of joint authorship.
However, when parties disagree on the intent to share ownership,
courts typically identify a dominant contributor, and prioritize his or
her intent. It is common in joint work cases that the efforts in produc-
ing a final product were not evenly distributed among the contribu-
tors.228 Attaining joint authorship does not require each person to
222. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
223. Id. at 509.
224. Id. at 508 (“We do not think [District Court] Judge Haight went so far. He did not
inquire whether Childress intended that she and Taylor would hold equal undivided inter-
ests in the play. But he properly insisted that they entertain in their minds the concept of
joint authorship, whether or not they understood precisely the legal consequences of that
relationship.”).
225. See, e.g., Design Options, Inc. v. Bellepointe, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (citing Childress, 945 F.2d at 508-09) (“[B]oth parties must have intended, at the time
of creation, that the work be jointly owned.”). Laura Lape cites to many cases that followed
Childress to require a higher level of intent than merely the intent to merge contributions
to be joint authors, and further argues “[w]hat the courts mean by the intent to be joint
authors is an intent to share ownership in a work.” Lape, supra note 20, at 58.
226. Childress, 945 F.2d at 508-09; Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202-04 (2d Cir.
1998) ((1) the decisionmaking authority one has over the final product, (2) how the work
is attributed in billing and/or copyright registration, and (3) what kind of written agree-
ment one has made with third parties).
227. See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1067-69 (7th Cir. 1994) (focus-
ing heavily on the statutory language to determine joint authorship). “[T]he intent prong
does not have to do with the collaborators’ intent to recognize each other as co-authors for
purposes of copyright law; the focus is on the parties’ intent to work together in the crea-
tion of a single product, not on the legal consequences of that collaboration.” Janky v.
Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing
Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068-69). See also supra note 206 (providing the statutory definition of a
joint work).
228. See, e.g., Janky, 576 F.3d at 363 (stating Farag’s contribution accounted for only ten
percent of the lyrics); Fisher v. Klein, 1990 WL 10072477, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1990)
(Fisher claimed that Klein’s contribution was only minimal as she never set her hands on
the material).
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contribute equally.229 But because joint authors have equal shares in
the property interests of the copyrighted work, contemporary courts
show concern for the dominant contributor’s property interests. In
Fisher v. Klein,230 the district court ruled that joint authorship will only
result where the dominant author intends to be sharing authorship.231
In Childress and Thomson v. Larson,232 the Second Circuit affirmed this
rule by finding that “[c]are must be taken . . . to guard against the risk
that a sole author is denied exclusive authorship status simply because
another person rendered some form of assistance,”233 focusing its rea-
soning only on the intent of each author.
C. What Kind of Contribution Can Make One a Joint Author?
The language in the 1976 Act does not provide adequate gui-
dance on what kinds of contributions are enough to be a joint author.
An early test, proposed by Professor Melville Nimmer,234 requires the
contribution to be more than de minimis.235 This test gradually gave
way to Paul Goldstein’s test requiring that contributions must be copy-
rightable, independent of the joint work.236
Courts admit that the statute is unclear whether each contribu-
tion to a joint work must be independently copyrightable,237 but still
adopt the test for policy reasons. For example, the Seventh Circuit, in
Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc.,238 stated that the policy goal is to en-
hance administrative and judicial efficiency, and applied a test that
would “allow contributors to avoid post-contribution disputes con-
229. See Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1921) (“It is not essential that the
execution of the work should be equally divided, as long as the general design and struc-
ture was agreed upon, the parties may divide their parts and work separately.”).
230. 1990 WL 10072477.
231. Id. at *6.
232. 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
233. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 1991); Thomson, 147 F.3d at 202
(quoting Childress, 945 F.2d at 504).
234. Melville Nimmer, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melville_Nimmer (last
updated Aug. 17, 2014).
235. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 6.07[A][1] (“It
is not necessary that the respective contributions of several authors to a single work be
equal, either quantitatively or qualitatively, in order to constitute them as joint authors.
However, each such contribution must, in any event, be more than de minimis. That is, a
person must add more than a word or a line to qualify as a joint author.”).
236. 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 4.2.1.2, at 4:16.
237. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 506.
238. 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
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cerning authorship, and to protect themselves by contract if it appears
that they would not enjoy protections of the Act itself.”239
The independent copyrightability requirement displays a contem-
porary judicial response to the joint work doctrine that was developed
through case law and adopted by Congress.240 However, some worry
that the property allocation function within the doctrine does not al-
ways lead to optimal results.241 Property interests may be too finely
divided if there are many contributors, or the equal division of rights
may discourage those who contributed more and may seem unfair.
However, if joint authorship is applied restrictively, it may also dis-
courage smaller but important contributions. When the joint work
rule was first proposed in the early twentieth century, some found it
unfair to distribute the property interests evenly among joint authors,
regardless of the amount of their contribution.242 Yet, when protec-
tion for joint works was finally codified as part of the 1976 Act, Con-
gress did not find it necessary to deviate from the tenant-in-common
property theory.243 Contemporary courts responded to the codifica-
tion by interpreting the doctrine narrowly, making it difficult for sec-
ondary contributors to obtain co-authorship in order to induce them
to negotiate their share with the main contributor.244 This allows
courts to avoid ordering a judicial transfer of property interests from
the dominant author to the contributors whom they often believe to
be less deserving. The independent copyrightability test asks contribu-
tors to clarify the process of collaboration by showing the particular
contributions of each author,245 and allows courts to appear more
neutral when deciding joint work cases.
239. Id. at 1069.
240. See infra note 243.
241. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45, pt. D, at 195-97. When the joint work
clause was first proposed in the early twentieth century, the Copyright Office suggested
treating joint authors as tenants-in-common. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976). In the
preparatory meetings, some argued that the distribution of property interests should be an
issue of contract and opposed implementing a general statutory rule. 2 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 45, pt. D, at 196-97. The Copyright Office responded by emphasizing that
such rule is not to restrict joint authors to negotiate their relationship via contractual
agreements, but only to deal with the situation where a contract is absent. Id. at 197. Never-
theless, some still argued that it is impossible to know what the relationships between col-
laborators were beforehand, and ridiculed this proposal. Id. at 196-97.
242. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45, pt. D, at 195-97.
243. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976).
244. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the policy goal is to enhance administrative and judicial efficiency—a test will “allow con-
tributors to avoid post-contribution disputes concerning authorship, and to protect them-
selves by contract if it appears that they would not enjoy protections of the Act itself”).
245. See 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 236, § 4.2.1.2, at 4:16.
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Nevertheless, efficiency in adjudication comes at the cost of sec-
ondary contributors’ potential joint authorship claims. Courts suggest
that independent copyrightability strikes the right balance between
contract and copyright law because any person whose contribution
does not qualify as copyrightable can still receive their share through
contractual arrangements. However, relationships between collabora-
tors often evolve over time. Having a pre-negotiated contract does not
guarantee that contributors will later remain satisfied with their previ-
ously-agreed share. If the courts are unwilling to adjust the distribu-
tion of shares to reflect the actual contributions, having a pre-
negotiated contract may hold one back from contributing more.
Heavy emphasis on the shared portion of property interests may also
result in discounting other incentives for collaborators to improve the
work.
D. Expert Authors and Allocation in Joint Work Cases
In joint work cases, where multiple skills and activities are in-
volved, courts are unable to use flexible definitions of the terms “origi-
nate” or “work of authorship” in its reasoning without articulating why
certain inputs count as deserving contributions and others do not.
When one co-author is a professional, courts are less likely to consider
another contributor as a joint author.246 Some courts appear to favor
the professionals, based on the assumption that the parties expect the
non-professional to own no property interests.247 However, not all
professionals are credited as joint authors. The image of expert au-
thor greatly affects copyright law’s ability to properly allocate
resources.
In BTE v. Bonnecaze,248 Bonnecaze, the drummer of the band
“Better than Ezra” (BTE), argued to be a joint author because he con-
tributed valuable elements to a song including the harmony, lyrics,
percussion and rhythms, melody and song, and musical structure.249
However, Bonnecaze as the drummer, unlike the songwriter, could
not present the court with a sheet of fixed composition or drumming
notations.250 The court discounted the notion that authorship in a
246. Lape, supra note 20, at 63-64 (“Note that where one alleged co-author is a profes-
sional, this circumstance appears to bias some courts against joint authorship.”).
247. Id. at 64 (“Such courts appear to assume that both parties expected that the non-
professional would own no interest; they therefore conclude that the non-professional
owns none.”).
248. 43 F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D. La. 1999).
249. Id. at 621.
250. Id. at 628.
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composition could be accomplished by spontaneously contributing in-
sights while “working up” a song.251 The court emphasized the distinc-
tion between the underlying music composition and the sound
recording.252 Finding that Bonnecaze failed to prove his alleged con-
tributions with a tangible form of expression, the court ruled that the
songwriter was the sole author.253 Bonnecaze is a professional musi-
cian, yet, the court’s distinction between the copyright of the sound
recording and the musical composition would still lead to the conclu-
sion that the songwriter was the sole author of the song even when
recordings of the jamming sessions demonstrated that Bonnecaze re-
vised the song. This distinction finds songwriters, as a general profes-
sion, to have a stronger association with the musical composition of a
work, thus is considered more of a natural author of a song when
compared to a drummer or other session musicians.
When the collaborator of a work is a business partner, some
courts apply a more relaxed standard if his or her professional prac-
tice is not directly associated with the specific subject matter in dis-
pute. In Fisher v. Klein,254 Klein was Fisher’s business partner in
making jewelry sculptures, and was in charge of business manage-
ment.255 Klein did not possess the skills required to carry out her ideas
for a particular jewelry sculpture method, and Fisher was the domi-
nant executor of the products.256 The court held that Klein did not
have to put her hands on the material to be considered a joint au-
thor.257 Her business contributions allowed Fisher to include clients’
preferences in the works, which was substantial enough to make her a
joint author.258
Similarly, in Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau,259
Farag, a band member, suggested to Janky, the main songwriter, lyrics
for a song, but did not provide fixed expressions of his ideas.260
Farag’s suggestions helped tailor the song to better suit their cus-
tomer’s vision.261 The Seventh Circuit admitted that Farag’s contribu-
251. Id.
252. Id. at 627-28.
253. Id. at 628.
254. 1990 WL 10072477 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1990).
255. Id. at *1.
256. Id. at *3.
257. Id. at *2.
258. Id. at *7.
259. 576 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2009).
260. Id. at 359.
261. Id.
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tion made this a “close case,”262 but nevertheless decided that Farag
was a joint author.263 In both Fisher and Janky, the courts valued the
unfixed contributions of secondary authors that made the products
more acceptable to clients, thus producing a higher commercial value
for these products.
Courts are generally unwilling to recognize client contributions
as sufficient for joint authorship, even though the incorporation of
their contributions is critical to making a sale. In several joint work
disputes regarding architecture drawings or floor plans of buildings,
courts found against holding clients as joint authors because (1) client
engagement is typical as part of the general client and engineer rela-
tionship;264 (2) clients, even if they provided thumbnail sketches that
sufficiently fixed their ideas, did not contribute to the fixation of the
floor plan itself;265 (3) client contributions are typically too trivial or
are merely ideas;266 and (4) clients generally lack the expertise for
turning the ideas into an actual product.267 While copyright’s thresh-
old for originality is low, courts deny clients’ contributions in disputed
works by differentiating a sketch from the floor plan, and then ques-
tioning the clients’ capability to turn their ideas into the floor plan.268
Floor plans are typically seen as a form of expression that only profes-
sionals can produce.269
Courts’ bias toward professionals in joint work cases is especially
highlighted in the professional-client scenario. When both parties are
of different professions, courts may find the contributions of profes-
sionals of a particular subject matter more valuable than those of a
262. Id. at 363.
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D.N.J. 1981); M.G.B. Homes, Inc.
v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1493 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Aitken, Hazen,
Hoffman, Miller, P. C. v. Empire Const. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 259 (D. Ne. 1982)) (“‘Such
involvement by a client in the preparation of architectural plans is normally expected. . . .
Such involvement does not, however, ordinarily render the client an “author.”’”).
265. See Watkins v. Chesapeake Custom Homes, L.L.C., 330 F. Supp. 2d 563, 573-74 (D.
Md. 2004); M.G.B. Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d at 1493.
266. See Watkins, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 574; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)) (“No author may copyright his
ideas or the facts he narrates.”).
267. See M.G.B. Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d at 1487.
268. See id. at 1493; Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P. C., 542 F. Supp. at 259.
269. Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P. C., 542 F. Supp. at 259 (“In [the general client-
engineer] relationship, it is quite normal for the client to supply the engineer or architect
with general design features which the client expects to be incorporated into the architec-
tural plans and for the professional then to create the design drawings incorporating those
features.”).
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contributor whose trade has a weaker association with the resulting
work. Nevertheless, those partner-collaborators whose professional
practices do not have a strong association with the product may attain
joint authorship if their contribution enhances the product’s value in
the market.
E. Professionalism: Connecting the Distribution of Material and
Symbolic Resources
Exposing the role of the expert author in joint work cases is key
to understanding how copyright law allocates not only material re-
sources, but also symbolic resources. Courts’ bias toward professional
practitioners not only grants them more property interests as the de-
serving owners of a work, but also implicitly recognizes their prestige,
authority, power, and privileged position in the production of copy-
rightable works.
A general bias for professional practitioners is rooted in the as-
sumption that professional practitioners are the ones who advance sci-
ence and culture.270 Thus, professional practitioners are the rightful
recipients of copyright’s financial incentives, granted in exchange for
producing more works to benefit the public. Through the expansion
of copyrightable subject matters advocated by professional organiza-
tions, copyright law inherently associates a particular profession with
its respective subject matter. When one collaborates to produce a
work that is not an usual product of her profession, a collaborator’s
contribution could be discounted in a joint work claim.
For example, copyright law adopts a narrow conception of musi-
cal works and tends to protect only that which can be notated in the
form of a score.271 Consequently, copyright law privileges certain mu-
sical elements that are important in western classical music, such as
melody and harmony, and undervalues others that are significant in
popular music, such as rhythm.272 Producing contemporary music
does not tend to follow the traditional model in which the composer
provides written sheet music to musicians who subsequently perform
270. See supra Part I.
271. Barron, supra note 127, at 26.
272. Id. at 26, 30-31; see also Copyright Criminals (PBS broadcast Jan. 10, 2010), available
at http://vimeo.com/9958864 (documentary produced by Kembrew McLeod and Benja-
min Franzen, 2009) (stating James Brown’s drummer, Clyde Stubblefield, was one of the
most sampled musicians, however, copyright royalties went to either the producers, the
record companies that owned the sampled tracks, or Brown). Stubblefield never received
compositional credit for any of the songs nor received royalties, and was only paid for his
time in the studio.
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the music without making significant changes.273 Rather, a collabora-
tive jamming process in the recording studio has largely replaced the
use of a written score, where the first fixation of a musical work is
made as a recording.274 From this perspective, Bonnecaze is an example
of the clash between contemporary musical practice and conventional
theories on how music is made. The decision awarding sole author-
ship to the songwriter reinforces the conceptual divide between song-
writers and musicians, as well as the connection between songwriters
and music compositions.
In Childress, the court held that “[a] playwright does not so easily
acquire [the status of] co-author.”275 The court disregarded the con-
tributions made by Taylor, the actress who was instrumental for the
play’s existence. In Erickson, one play in dispute was generated
through improvisation—“a form of theatre in which there is no
script.”276 The play was not written using the traditional model where
a script is provided by the playwright, but instead was developed
through a collaborative process.277 The playwright also initially
credited one of the participating actors as the co-author.278 Neverthe-
less, the Seventh Circuit still considered Erickson as the sole author of
the play because the actor was unable to prove her contribution was
independently copyrightable.279
The same theory of bias seen in music also applies to theater—
copyright law prefers written plays and discredits contributions made
by actors who did not write down the revisions they themselves made.
Even if a play was admittedly improvised, the playwright is still ad-
vantaged by having the responsibility to organize notes of the scenes,
despite the authors contributing and collectively agreeing upon such
alterations. Courts appear to view the playwright as the special figure
who exercises professional judgment and aesthetic control over a
play.280 However, historically the playwright has not always assumed
such a special position. The playwright was not associated with such an
authorial position in Elizabethan plays, and actors regularly held au-
273. See Barron, supra note 127, at 29, 36.
274. Jason Toynbee, Musicians, in MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT 127 (Simon Frith & Lee Mar-
shall eds., 2d ed. 2004); Gabriel Jacob Fleet, What’s in a Song? Copyright’s Unfair Treatment of
Record Producers and Side Musicians, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1251 (2008).
275. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
276. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1064 (7th Cir. 1994).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1072.
280. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 509; Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1071-72.
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thorship status.281 The playwright, if mentioned at all, was almost
never considered the author, but rather was referred to as “our poet”
and adjunct to the proprietary group of performers.282
In photography, contributions such as posing the subjects, select-
ing and arranging costumes, draperies, lighting, and shading, are all
regarded as elements of originality.283 However, courts do not pro-
duce consistent opinions when photographers do not carry out these
elements. In Gillespie v. AST Sportswear, Inc.,284 the designer of a line of
AST’s sportswear claimed joint authorship in the photos taken for an
advertising catalog.285 The court found that professional photography
“often requires the participation of many individuals,”286 and “a per-
son need not hold the camera or push a button to be considered the
author of a visual work, since one can exercise control over the con-
tent of a work without holding the camera.”287 In Tang v. Putruss,288 a
case having similar facts as Gillespie, Putruss contributed to the photo
shoot by selecting the models, gowns, accessories, and poses.289 The
court, however, did not find Putruss’ contribution to the set-up for the
photograph to amount to what the court in Gillespie regarded as suffi-
cient for joint authorship.290 It therefore granted sole authorship to
the professional photographer.291
It is uncertain why similar contributions to the production of a
photograph garnered differing holdings on the claim for joint author-
ship. One explanation could be how each court viewed the profes-
sions of the secondary contributors. In Gillespie, the person working
on behalf of AST was the designer after whom the particular line of
garments was named.292 Whereas in Tang, the person working on be-
half of the clothing company was the principle for the business.293 A
fashion designer is not necessarily associated with the production of
photographs. However, his aesthetic role and professional reputation
281. DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 42-43 (1992) (citing Joseph Loew-
enstein, The Script in the Market Place, 12 REPRESENTATIONS 101, 102 (1985)).
282. Id.
283. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
284. No. 97Civ.1911(PKL), 2001 WL 180147 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001).
285. Id. at *1-2.
286. Id. at *6.
287. Id.
288. 521 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
289. Id. at 604-05.
290. Id. at 607.
291. Id. at 608.
292. Gillespie, No. 97Civ.1911(PKL), 2001 WL 180147, at *1.
293. Tang, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
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are more at stake if the clothing line carrying his name is displayed in
the photograph. This suggests that such designer has a greater incen-
tive to assert aesthetic control over the photographs as compared to a
business manager. Thus, while both Gillespie and Tang involved unau-
thorized uses of photographs in subsequent catalogs, AST was seen as
a collaborator and joint author, while Putruss was held to infringe.
The low originality threshold and abandonment of the 1909 Act’s
formality requirements suggests the United States currently has an
egalitarian copyright regime in which anyone can easily become a le-
gal author for mundane communicative activities. But this egalitarian
picture does not hold true in joint work cases. Rather, the image of
expert author held in joint work cases suggests a stratified system.
With the involvement of various kinds of collaborators, joint work
cases demonstrate how the image of the expert author has induced
courts to rule in favor of professional practitioners.
IV. The Return of the Lay Public?
While there is a connection between the allocation of symbolic
resources and the distribution of material resources in copyright law,
this Article does not suggest that copyright law alone determines the
distribution of symbolic resources. Other institutions exist that sustain
the boundary between professionals and lay people (i.e., between
those with prestige and those without).294 When court decisions chal-
lenge these boundaries, extra-legal institutions may wish to respond in
their own way. For example, scientists form a reputable and tight-knit
community within society and its established social norms for accredi-
tation will not be easily challenged by the copyright system.
In Weissmann v. Freeman,295 Weissmann argued that she was pres-
sured to comply with the norms for publishing scientific research296
294. For example, knowledge and expertise are often accredited by the completion of
an educational degree, and new knowledge is often vetted by a normalized evaluation pro-
cess as part of the publication process. See PETER W.B. PHILLIPS, GOVERNING TRANSFORMA-
TIVE TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: WHO’S IN CHARGE ch. 9 (2007). Wikipedia’s open-
editing model is often discussed in contrast with the more traditional models as in Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, which emphasizes its credibility guaranteed by professionalism and a vet-
ting process. See Shun-Ling Chen, Wikipedia: A Republic of Science Democratized, 20 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 247, 278 (2010). However, Wikipedia’s model does not pose a fundamental
challenge for the traditional knowledge certification process as it requires editors to pro-
vide reliable sources and reproduces the hierarchy of certified knowledge. See id. at 273.
295. 684 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
296. David Healy & Dinah Cattell, Interface Between Authorship, Industry and Science in the
Domain of Therapeutics, 183 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 22, 22-23 (2003). “There were a number of publi-
cations that the document suggests originated within communication agencies, with the
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by listing Freeman, a renowned researcher, as the co-author.297 Al-
though the appellate court legally vindicated her rights as the sole
author of the disputed work, the outcome did not redistribute the
symbolic resources between Freeman and Weissmann in the scientific
community. Conversely, Weissmann’s victory in court contributed to
her expatriation from the community.298 The fact that the scientific
community can treat copyright law as an external rule and continue to
enforce its own norms shows the relative autonomy it enjoys. Such
autonomy is the result of the symbolic weight bestowed upon the sci-
entific community’s judgment.299 For those lacking reputation and
first draft of articles already written and the authors’ names listed as ‘to be determined.’”
Id. at 22-23.
The profile of the articles reported here suggests that the background of certain
authors may have increased the possibility of the company’s publications appear-
ing in the most prestigious journals. Specific journals seem to have been
targeted. . . . [G]hostwriting . . . leads to a lack of recognition for the people who
actually write the articles. . . . [A]cademics become opinion leaders . . . because
they get asked to national and international meetings to present data with which
they may not have first-hand acquaintance. . . . [T]hese authors cannot share
proprietary raw data with colleagues in the way that has been traditional in the
science domain.
Id. at 25.
297. Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1254 (“Plaintiff testified, in substance, that from the
very beginning when she started as a resident, Dr. Freeman had made it clear to her that
there are different kinds of articles that ‘we’ write; as to journal articles, for example, plain-
tiff said that it was clear Freeman expected his name to be added to them when done and
submitted by any physician in his division. Plaintiff acquiesced in that procedure; she testi-
fied that ‘he was responsible for what I was saying, but I really was doing the primary
research.’”).
Weissmann also commented in an interview conducted a few years after the trial:
The understanding was that as my chief [Freeman] could ask my permission to
add his name, and I would comply. There were numerous articles and chapters
that I had where he did ask, and I did add his name. During the court case he
tried to use the prior gratuitous coauthorship I had given him as an attempted
defense of the later outright plagiarism.
Insults and Injuries, 13 WOMEN’S REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 1996, at 21.
298. See Insults and Injuries, 13 WOMEN’S REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 1996, at 21 (stating that
Weissmann’s department locked her out of her office on the day the trial began in 1987,
and quoting her saying “I left, knowing that it was the end of my job, but never thinking
that it was going to be the end of my career”). After winning the plagiarism case in the
appellate court, Weissmann filed an employment discrimination case against her institute
and received a settlement of $900,000. Id. at 22. However, as part of the settlement she had
to agree never to apply for a job at the same institute, or any other institute that are or ever
will become its affiliates. Id. “At the time of the settlement there were 29 affiliates. In this
era of health care reform where everyone is affiliating, the number has increased, and as
long as that condition stands I can’t apply to any of these places in the greater New York
area for employment.” Id.
299. See Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1 MI-
NERVA 54 (1962), reprinted in 38 MINERVA 1, 7 (2000) (stating that the body of scientists as a
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status, either in society at large or within particular communities, sym-
bolic resources do not necessarily come attached with property inter-
ests given under copyright law.
This Part addresses the phenomenon of the return of the lay pub-
lic,300 represented by large-scale self-organized collaborative works,301
and its implications on copyright’s role in allocating material and sym-
bolic resources within society.
A. The Lay Public Become Authors—The Irony of the 1976 Act
The 1976 Act marked a watershed in U.S. copyright history by
relaxing the formality requirements of the 1909 Act, and changing the
fixed-term duration of copyright to a single term that attaches to an
author’s life.302 Register Barbara Ringer explained in her address to
Congress, “[W]hen the author figuratively lifts his pen from his paper,
he has a copyright under the Federal law and under the Constitution,
and he has it for his lifetime.”303 Ringer reasoned that the formality
requirements became outdated when applied to new forms of trans-
mission other than print publication.304 Additionally, for print publi-
whole exercises authority of knowledge and science over the lay public). The scientific
community controls how new members are trained and admitted. Id. Once admitted, new
members “join[ ] a chain of mutual appreciations.” Id. Still, power and authority are not
evenly distributed within the community. Id. Peer-review, as a dominant knowledge-certify-
ing mechanism in scientific journal publication, emphasizes this concept of members exer-
cising authority over each other within the scientific community. Id. Peer reviewed articles
are important to scholars to enter the job market, to accumulate credits and to secure
tenure positions. See Gary Holden, Gary Rosenberg & Kathleen Barker, Bibliometrics: A Po-
tential Decision Making Aid in Hiring, Reappointment, Tenure and Promotion Decisions, 41 SOCIAL
WORK IN HEALTH CARE 67, 67-68 (2005); Stephen J. Zyzanski, Robert L. Williams, Susan A.
Flocke, Louise S. Acheson & Robert B. Kelly, Academic Achievement of Successful Candidates for
Tenure and Promotion to Associate Professor, 28 FAMILY MEDICINE 358, 358 (1996).
Some scholars criticize the self-referential model because makes it difficult for outsiders to
challenge the norms and authority asserted by the scientific community. See SHEILA JASA-
NOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAKERS 64 (2009) (regarding profes-
sionalism as an institution that allows the scientific profession to “maintain its monopoly
over scientific knowledge and over the allocation of funds for the generation of new knowl-
edge”). Self-policing allows professional scientists to “enhance the autonomy and social
prestige of science, while holding scientists accountable only to standards considered rea-
sonable by their [peers].” Id.
300. This Article defines lay public to include general members of the public, and also
members of the public that are experts but lack official credentials.
301. For example, free software projects and Wikipedia.
302. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102 Stat.
2853-61 (eliminating the formality requirements).
303. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
107 (1976).
304. Id.
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cations under the 1909 Act, an author could “throw [his] work into
the public domain regardless of what [his] intentions were” if copy-
right notice was not in the correct form or position.305 While com-
mentators associate the notion of paternalism more often with an
author’s right to terminate grants of licenses,306 Tom Bell suggests
that copyright protection is akin to “author’s welfare.”307 Comparing
copyright law with social welfare policies, and “starving artists” with
the “deserving poor,” Bell argues that the two exhibit similar paternal-
istic features.308 By assuming that authors striving to claim copyright
protection are so incompetent that they could not meet the 1909 Act’s
formality requirement, copyright protection now arises automatically
upon completion of a work in order to protect such incompetent au-
thors from inadvertently losing their property interests.
Several scholars advocate for reintroducing notice formality re-
quirements that apply to both domestic and international copyright
law regimes.309 It is more efficient for society to ask authors to prop-
erly mark off their copyright claims than requiring the public to trace
copyright owners to seek permission to use the work.310 Formality re-
quirements serve a filtering function by distinguishing the works au-
thors desire to protect with copyright from those they do not, as
authors rarely want to copyright every piece of work they produce.311
The formality-free rule did not anticipate the boom of informa-
tion enabled by digital technologies, which produces a vast amount of
unidentified works, and increases the cost of searching for copyright
owners.312 It is ironic that the 1976 Act, which attempts to protect
professional practitioners, now turns everyone into a potential author
protected under copyright law.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist’s Approach to a Techno-
logical Age, 43 STAN. L. REV. 943, 947 (1991).
307. Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing
Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 261 (2003).
308. Id. at 259-61.
309. See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 554
(2004); James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 211 (2005);
WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 203-09 (2011).
310. Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/
Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 342 (2010).
311. See Sprigman, supra note 309, at 502.
312. See Copyright Registration and Documentation, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://
www.wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/copyright_registration/index.html (last visited Mar.
6, 2014).
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B. The Rise of Mass-Collaborative Projects: Private Ordering313
Between Lay Authors
The assumptions that (1) one would not be motivated to produce
works without the property interests granted by copyright law, (2) one
imagines every product as a commodity, (3) only professionals can
produce quality works, and (4) that the current copyright system is
indispensable for society to enjoy new and high-quality cultural prod-
ucts, are greatly debated. Contrary to how the public was imagined
during the congressional hearings,314 some members of the public
step outside the passive role of receivers and consumers of
information.
The software developing community is one of the first groups to
challenge this paradigm.315 They strategically used the owner-author
position they obtained under copyright law to develop alternative cop-
yright licenses and prevent the exploitation of their code, while simul-
taneously ensuring that the code can be shared. The licenses grant
users, who are also recognized as potential developers, the freedom to
tinker with their work. Over time, the free software community
worked out a system that recruited enough developers to participate
without directly referencing the need for monetary rewards.316
Beginning in the early 2000s, Wikipedia, using similar private or-
dering strategies, also attracted a large number of contributors. In less
than a decade, Wikipedia quickly became the piece de resistance of the
new community-based, peer-production model.317 These self-organ-
ized, community-based collaborative projects signify the comeback of
the lay public speaking its discontent with the current state of copy-
right law. The free software community and other commons-based,
peer-production communities are able to develop common-pool re-
sources that continue to exist and grow.
313. See supra note 10 (defining “private ordering”).
314. See supra Part II.C.
315. See Christopher Kelty, Inventing Copyleft, in MAKING AND UNMAKING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CREATIVE PRODUCTION IN LEGAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 133-46 (Mario Biagi-
oli et al. eds., 2011).
316. Developers value indirect interests, such as the attention economy generated from
the software contribution. Highly visible free software contributors often are hired for
good positions.
317. See Wikipedia: About, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About
(last modified July 18, 2014) (stating Wikipedia exists in more than 285 languages with the
English Wikipedia alone having more than four million articles and nearly twenty-two mil-
lion registered users).
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C. Are Mass-Collaborative Projects Credible?—Lay Authors
Without Symbolic Resources
Private ordering is possible because the community members in-
dividually own their works under copyright law and are free to redis-
tribute their property interests.318 Nevertheless, members of these self-
organized communities lack the symbolic resources, which are tradi-
tionally assigned to professional practitioners. This statement proves
true, as community members can be experts in certain fields, yet each
member’s reputation is not carried over to large participatory projects
with an open contribution structure. Although all the contributors are
authors under copyright law, mere copyright ownership does not au-
tomatically confer symbolic resources to the organized public and its
resulting products. The lack of symbolic resources, and the missing or
erased, connection between the lay public and societal progress in the
arts and sciences have become major hurdles for the public to over-
come in resuming its role in the process of cultural production.319
Professional authors and publishers, having depended on the
copyright system and lobbied for its further expansion, feel
threatened by the rising importance of the collaborative production
model.320 Since the collaborative model is efficient in producing
works, professional practitioners often seek to discredit collaborative
communities by (1) dismissing their works as amateurish, (2) ques-
tioning the qualitative value of the work, and (3) presenting them-
318. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 399-400. The enforceability of these licenses
creates res universitatis—a “type of property that is non-exclusive but also bounded.” Carol
Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 108 (2003). By policing the boundary of disruptive behav-
ior, res universitatis can encourage “group interactions that greatly foster creativity.” Id. at
108.
319. Cultural production refers to the normative development process of sociology,
sciences, law, religion, and expressive-asthetic activities such as art, music, or literature.
David Hesmondhalgh, Bourdieu, the Media and Cultural Production, 28 MEDIA, CULTURE, &
SOCIETY 211, 212 (2006).
320. For example, in 1998, the Halloween Documents—a series of confidential docu-
ments produced by Microsoft analyzing potential strategies to approach the threats created
by free software—were leaked. Halloween Documents, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Halloween_documents (last modified June 26, 2014). The fact that the software giant
started to feel threatened by “hobbyists” signaled the success of the free software move-
ment in creating a viable alternative to the proprietary software model.
In the field of encyclopedia, Britannica adjusted to new media and began to include user
suggestions, although still priding itself for having expert contributors, a team of profes-
sional editors, as well as a “rigorous editorial process,” which new articles and proposed
revisions have to go through before they are published. Is Britannica Going Wiki?, ENCYCLO-
PAEDIA BRITANNICA BLOG (Mar. 8, 2009), http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2009/03/is
-britannica-going-wiki/.
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selves as the real expert-authors, the producers, and gatekeepers of
quality and valuable cultural works.321
Fortunately for free software advocates, even if the collaborative
model lacked the social credibility possessed by established, proprie-
tary software companies, the visibility and use of its products helped to
validate the model and accumulate the symbolic resources it previ-
ously lacked.322 However, Wikipedia has more difficulty in establishing
credibility and gaining symbolic resources. Wikipedia demonstrates its
viability as a sustainable project because of its extreme popularity, vol-
ume of information, and competitiveness against its long-time reputa-
ble proprietary counterparts (e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica).323
Wikipedia’s prominence as one of the most visited websites is undeni-
321. See, e.g., Bill Gates, An Open Letter to Hobbyists, 2 HOMEBREW COMP. CLUB 2 (1976),
available at http://www.classiccmp.org/cini/pdf/HT68K/Hcc-vol2-1.pdf (portraying pro-
prietary software companies as innovators and the software developers outside of these
business establishments as amateur “hobbyists”). In 1998, when free software started to
gain momentum, “Gates publicly stated that Linux posed no competitive threat to
Microsoft.” E. GABRIELLA COLEMAN, CODING FREEDOM: THE ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF
HACKING 80 (2013). Yet, in the same year, a leaked Microsoft internal report (Halloween
Documents) expressed anxiety about free and open source software. See id. at 80-81.
Microsoft since continued to discredit free software. See Microsoft: Open Source ‘Not Reliable or
Dependable,’ CNET (May 19, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/Microsoft-Open-source-not-relia
ble-or-dependable/2100-7344_3-6074237.html. There are also many criticisms of
Wikipedia. See, e.g., Stephen T. Jordan, The Problem of the Aggregate Author: Attribution, Ac-
countability, and the Construction of Collaborative Knowledge in Online Communities, 4 INT’L J. OF
THE BOOK 161, 161 (2007) (criticizing Wikipedia and discussing the credibility of sources
when there is an absence of participation from the academic society); Brock Read, Can
Wikipedia Ever Make the Grade?, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 27, 2006), http://
chronicle.com/article/Can-Wikipedia-Ever-Make-the/26960/ (discussing Wikipedia’s re-
fusal to give professors or other experts priority); Criticism of Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Wikipedia (last modified Sept. 22, 2014).
322. See COLEMAN, supra note 321, at 88-89.
323. See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, 438 NATURE 900, 900-01
(2005), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v438/n7070/full/438900a
.html (conducting the first study using peer review to compare Wikipedia and Encyclopaedia
Britannica). The result showed that the two are overall comparable, though there were
slightly more errors found in Wikipedia. Id. In 2011, a study concluded that Wikipedia is a
good source of data for political scientists, although its coverage on older and more ob-
scure topics is less complete as compared to recent and prominent subjects. Adam R.
Brown, Wikipedia as a Data Source for Political Scientists: Accuracy and Completeness of Coverage,
44 POL. SCI. & POLITICS 339, 339-43 (2001). In 2012, Encyclopaedia Britannica announced it
would stop making a printed version, which was not surprising since the number of Britan-
nica sets sold in 2009 was only 8,000—a steep drop from 40,000 in 1996. Matt Silverman,
Encyclopedia Britannica vs. Wikipedia [Infographic], MASHABLE (Mar. 16, 2012), http://mash
able.com/2012/03/16/encyclopedia-britannica-wikipedia-infographic/. Meanwhile, the
Wikimedia Foundation received sixty million donations to support Wikipedia and its sister
projects. Id. The last printed edition of Britannica in 2012 contained 65,000 entries, while
the English Wikipedia at that time had more than three million articles. Id.
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able.324 Yet, Wikipedia is often criticized for not being a credible re-
source and remains a predominately amateur-edited reference
work.325 Unlike traditional encyclopedias, Wikipedia does not rely on
the symbolic resources garnered by the contributions of experts in
order to assert authority and prestige. Contrary to the practice of
traditional encyclopedias that bury the disclaimer for accuracy while
simultaneously emphasizing its reliability,326 Wikipedia warns its read-
ers that there is no guarantee for accuracy in bolded font at the top of
its disclaimer page.327 Nevertheless, Wikipedia still strives to build a
324. See The Top 500 Sites on the Web, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites (last visited
Aug. 15, 2014) (indicating Wikipedia is the sixth most visited website, after Google,
Facebook, Youtube, Yahoo, and Baidu).
325. See Editor Survey 2011/Profiles, WIKIMEDIA, http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Editor
_Survey_2011/Profiles (last modified July 7, 2013). According to a 2011 editor survey con-
ducted by the Wikimedia Foundation, 8% of Wikipedia editors have PhD degrees, 18%
with a master’s degree, and 35% with a bachelor’s degree. Id. The report also revealed that
30% of editors have obtained a secondary degree, and 9% have just a primary education.
Id. However, these numbers are self-reported, and because Wikipedia allows for pseudo-
nymity and anonymity, official credentials of editors are hard to verify. See id.
326. See, e.g., About World Book, Inc., WORLD BOOK, http://www.worldbook.com/world
-book-corporate/about-world-book?wbredirect=1&Itemid=197 (last visited Apr. 21, 2014)
(stating “World Book, Inc., sets the standard for providing accurate, objective, and reliable
reference and instructional materials” in the first sentence on its About page and disclaim-
ing accuracy in the middle of its terms and conditions). World Book’s disclaimer states that
it “does not warrant or make any representations regarding the use or the results of the use
of the Sites in terms of its quality, correctness, accuracy, reliability, or otherwise.” Terms
& Conditions, WORLD BOOK, http://www.worldbook.com/world-book-corporate
/terms-a-conditions (last visited May 30, 2014). Similarly, on the corporate Encyclopaedia
Britannica website, the company expressly claims to “provide timely, relevant, and trustwor-
thy information and instructional products.” Britannica Today, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://corporate.britannica.com/about/today/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2014). Yet in its terms
of use, Encyclopaedia Britannica also includes a disclaimer of warranties. Online Services Usage
Agreement (“Terms of Use”) For All Britannica Sites, Services and Applications Advertising-Supported
and Subscription, Consumer and Institutional, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://corporate
.britannica.com/termsofuse.html (last updated Mar. 26, 2014).
327. See Wikipedia: General Disclaimer, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipe
dia:General_disclaimer (last modified Jan. 24, 2014) (“Please be advised that nothing
found here has necessarily been reviewed by people with the expertise required to provide
you with complete, accurate or reliable information. That is not to say that you will not find
valuable and accurate information in Wikipedia; much of the time you will. However,
WIKIPEDIA CANNOT GUARANTEE THE VALIDITY OF THE INFORMATION FOUND HERE. . . . Note that
most other encyclopedias and reference works also have disclaimers.”). See also Wikipedia:
Content Disclaimer, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Content_disclaimer
(last modified May 22, 2014) (“Wikipedia contains obscure information that would not be
covered in a conventional encyclopedia. Wikipedia’s coverage is based on the interests of
its volunteer contributors. Readers should not judge the importance of topics based on
their coverage in Wikipedia, nor assume that a topic is important merely because it is the
subject of a Wikipedia article.”).
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certain level of credibility as an important discursive platform,328 and
a project worth contributing. It also seems that the credibility of a
reference work is more difficult to assess than the usefulness of
software,329 thus harder for Wikipedia to establish integrity based on
level of use.
The ideas to establish things such as free software and
Wikipedia’s public-contributed, reference database derived from soci-
ety’s distrust for the institutionalized authority of both proprietary
software companies and publishers.330 Compared to other open-
source software projects, Wikipedia appears to dispose of the image of
the expert-author more radically since contributing texts in natural
languages seems easier than contributing source code in program-
ming languages.331 The contributions of lay people are the source of
Wikipedia’s credibility issue and expose the project to more distrust
for lacking symbolic resources. Edit wars on Wikipedia are common
on pages explaining controversial topics.332 Although relying on the
credentials and authority of expert authors may mitigate such dis-
agreements, it is a solution that the Wikipedia model does not
utilize.333
328. See Category: Wikipedia Content Policies, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Category:Wikipedia_content_policies (last modified Apr. 13, 2014) (attempting to en-
courage a certain level of quality by providing links to Wikipedia’s sets of content policies
including among others: verifiability, no original research, and neutral point of view).
329. Prominent free software projects such as Linux, Apache, Firefox, and Android
indicate that they are viable substitutes for proprietary options. See August 2013 Web Server
Survey, NETCRAFT, http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/08/09/august-2013-web-
server-survey.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2014); Emily Protalinski, IE11 More Than Triples
Market Share to 10.42%, Firefox Slips a Bit, and Chrome Gains Back Share, THE NEXT WEB (Jan.
2, 2014), http://thenextweb.com/insider/2014/01/02/ie11-triples-market-share-10-42-
firefox-slips-bit-chrome-gains-back-share/#!zJKX8; Jon Fingas, Android Climbed to 79 Percent
of Smartphone Market Share in 2013, But Its Growth Has Slowed, ENGADGET (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.engadget.com/2014/01/29/strategy-analytics-2013-smartphone-share/.
330. See supra Part IV.B.
331. But see Wikipedia: Visual Editor, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:  VisualEditor (last modified Sept. 12, 2014) (providing a new tool for contribut-
ing source code that offers an easy to use interface).
332. See Besiki Stvilia, Michael B. Twidale, Linda C. Smith & Les Gasser, Information
Quality Work Organization in Wikipedia, 59 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 983, 999 (2008).
333. See Wikipedia: Verifiability, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Ver
ifiability (last modified Sept. 9, 2014); Wikipedia: Citing Sources, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citing_sources (last modified Oct. 3, 2014). In 2007, a
scandal erupted after a prominent user operating under a pseudonym revealed his faked
credentials. See Chen, supra note 294, at 286. The Wikipedia community did not respond to
this incident by asking general users’ to reveal their identities, but rather it started to re-
quire users with higher levels of administrative responsibility to provide personal identifica-
tion to the Wikimedia Foundation. Id. at 287.
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D. The Disenfranchised Public Re-Entering Copyright Politics
Various copyright-affected industries heavily lobbied for the es-
tablishment of copyright law, and organizations heavily advocating for
the public rarely got a seat at the table.334 In the congressional hear-
ings regarding legislative expansion of copyright, the voice of the pub-
lic was largely missing.335 The lay public, seen as passive receivers and
consumers of products, has been disenfranchised in the politics of
copyright law. Professional groups repeatedly assert that their finan-
cial interests coincide with the public interest since they claim that
professionals produce quality products that enhance public discourse.
The Copyright Office considers the promotion of the public interest
as part of their mission, but the legislative history shows professional
groups are its primary constituency.336 The decreasing cost in repro-
duction and distribution of copyrighted works due to new technologi-
cal development created more conflict between the public and
professional content producers, escalating to the level of a “copyright
war.”337 Empowered by new information technologies, the lay public
fights professional organizations that push for stronger and more re-
strictive copyright protection, seeking to limit the public’s newly ac-
quired power.
The U.S. Supreme Court has done little to avail the lay public and
reverse the trend of copyright expansion. In landmark cases such as
Eldred v. Ashcroft338 and Golan v. Holder,339 the Supreme Court recog-
nized the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act and
the Uruguay Round Agreement Act—with the former granting twenty
more years of exclusive rights for new and existing copyrighted
works,340 and the latter resurrecting copyright protection of foreign
works that had previously fallen into the public domain in the United
States.341 In both cases, the Supreme Court upheld the legislation be-
cause Congress has the constitutional authority to decide the appro-
334. Jessica Litman, The Politics of Intellectual Property, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313,
314 (2009).
335. See supra Part II.C.
336. See supra Part II.C; Litman, supra note 334, at 314-15.
337. Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 34th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 53 J. COPY-
RIGHT SOC’Y 1, 1-2 (2006) (tracing the origin of the term to a 1995 whitepaper prepared by
the White House Information Infrastructure Task Force, and by 2003 the term was used so
often it became standard).
338. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
339. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
340. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195 (2003). “In sum, we find that the CTEA is a
rational enactment.” Id. at 208.
341. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 875 (2012).
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priate scope of copyright law to promote the useful arts and
sciences.342 Even though a law that extends copyright protection ret-
rospectively to existing works does not provide any new incentives to
the author, and despite the inadvertent impacts such a law might have
on the public, the Supreme Court assumes Congress conducts the
proper weighing of opposing interests before enacting a statute.343
For the disenfranchised lay public, these judicial interpretations are
unfortunate because the transcript from the congressional hearings
shows that the legislative floor is not a fair playground.344 The Court’s
ruling disregards the absence of the public interest problem that has
persisted throughout the history of copyright law, offers no assistance
to those who were unable to participate in the previous negotiations,
and confirms the copyright politics that gives priority to special inter-
est groups over the public’s interest in free speech and access to
information.
In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,345 the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the trend of favoring publishers and held that individuals
who purchase cheaper books printed in foreign countries to resell in
the United States do not infringe publishers’ copyright because the
342. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888.
343. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198 (“[T]his Court has been similarly deferential to the judg-
ment of Congress in the realm of copyright.”); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889 (“[Section] 514 falls
comfortably within Congress’ authority under the Copyright Clause. Congress rationally
could have concluded that adherence to Berne ‘promotes the diffusion of knowledge.’”
(quoting Brief for Petitioners at 4, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545),
2011 WL 2423674, at *4)). “A well-functioning international copyright system would likely
encourage the dissemination of existing and future works.” Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889.
344. See, e.g., supra Part II.C; Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680,
H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1208 (1965) (statement of Hayward Cirker, President, Dover Publications, Inc.).
Who is speaking for the [public who will bear the increased cost imposed by this
revision]? This great mysterious copyright area is not likely to arouse the public
and consumers into group action, and the absence of pressure from these groups
may be creating a very distorted picture. I hope that my testimony may disturb
you and make you realize that someone is going to pay for all these lovely gifts
generously given to private interests, and that someone is the public.
Id. at 1208.
Congressman Robert Kastenmeier acknowledged that although there were oppositions to
aspects of the revision from teachers and organizations, he was not sure “whether anyone
ha[d] appeared opposed to the bill in terms of certain specifics and purportedly in behalf
of the public,” as Cirker did in his testimony. Id. at 1209. Congressman Herbert Tenzer
noted that Cirker was the only publisher that spoke against the term extension, to which
Cirker clarified that he spoke on behalf of himself and not as a publisher, otherwise he
would support the extension. Id. at 1212.
345. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
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first sale doctrine346 applies internationally.347 In the majority opin-
ion, Justice Breyer reasoned that ruling in an opposite decision would
have negative impacts on the public.348 Justice Ginsburg, who wrote
the majority opinion in Eldred and Golan, in her dissenting opinion
called the suggested negative impacts a “parade of horribles [that is]
largely imaginary,” and expressed concerns for the publishers’ ability
to maximize profit.349 The outcome of Kirtsaeng differed from Eldred
and Golan because international treaties do not dictate domestic ex-
haustion as a rule, and Congress has not spoken on the issue. Had the
special interests of organizations persuaded Congress to codify the do-
mestic first sale doctrine, Kirtsaeng could have had an opposite
outcome.
In light of the legislative history and judicial decisions, it is hard
to overlook the series of public outrage and campaign against two bills
that sought to strengthen the enforcement of copyright—Stop Online
Piracy Act (SOPA)350 and Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA).351
The public campaign to squash the bills climaxed on January 18,
2012, when Wikipedia, along with several other websites, temporarily
suspended their services and directed visitors to a protest message.352
This action resulted in millions of tweets,353 millions of signatures for
the petition against the bills, and millions of emails to Congress.354
These widespread protests killed the two bills that were expected to
346. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (stating that the lawful owner of a particular copy of
a work is entitled, without first obtaining the authority of the copyright owner, “to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy”).
347. Kirstaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355-56.
348. Id. at 1366-67 (stating that a geographical interpretation of the first-sale doctrine
could have a negative impact on foreign trade, and also would require booksellers, librar-
ies, museums, retailers, etc. to engage in a complex permission-verifying process to deter-
mine copyright status).
349. Id. at 1373-74.
350. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
351. S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
352. See Wikipedia: SOPA Protest Led 8 Million to Look Up Reps in Congress, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
19, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2012/01/wikipedia-sopa-blackout-
congressional-representatives.html; Matt Peckham, Did It Work? ‘Day After’ Results of the
SOPA, PIPA Blackout, TIME (Jan. 19, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/01/19/did-it-
work-day-after-results-of-the-sopa-pipa-blackout/?xid=gonewsedit; Andy Greenberg, Amidst
SOPA Blackout, Senate Copyright Bill Loses Key Supporters, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/01/18/amidst-sopa-blackout-senate-copyright-bill-
loses-a-key-supporter/.
353. Tweet, TECHTERMS.COM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/tweet (last up-
dated Mar. 19, 2009) (defining a “tweet” as “an online posting, or ‘micro-blog’ created by a
Twitter user).
354. See Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/technology/senate-
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sail through Congress.355 Adrian Johns, a professor and historian of
copyright and piracy,356 stated, “For the first time, public resistance
had called a halt to a process in which intellectual property law had
expanded inexorably for as long as anyone could remember.”357
The Wikipedia blackout was a spectacle, as the community of
Wikipedia editors for the first time worked to protect its interest in
ensuring a legal environment that permits its collaborative model to
prosper. Jimmy Wales, the co-founder of Wikipedia, and Kat Walsh,
then chair of the Wikimedia Foundation358 Board of Trustees, wrote
an op-ed piece following the blackout stating, “We acknowledge[ ]
that our existence is itself political, and we spoke up to protect it.”359
The long-disenfranchised lay public has not only returned in the form
of self-organized, collaborative groups that refuse to follow the inter-
est-based underpinnings of copyright law. In the campaign against
SOPA and PIPA, the public returned as an undeniable political force
that strove to protect a legal regime that allows sharing and collabora-
tion in the production of cultural and informational materials. The
op-ed piece clarifies that Wikipedia is not against copyright laws per
se, and that Congress should recognize the publishing industry’s con-
tribution to innovation and economy.360 However, it declared that in
the new collaborative model of knowledge production, the public is
the media industry, the authors, and the innovators.361 It also re-
quested that Congress make laws that recognize the value and power
of free and open knowledge.362
SOPA and PIPA were killed in January 2012, but that did not sig-
nify that Congress now gives more recognition to the capacity of the
postpones-piracy-vote.html?_r=0; Wikipedia: SOPA Protest Led 8 Million to Look up Reps in Con-
gress, supra note 352; Peckham, supra note 352.
355. See Julianne Pepitone, SOPA and PIPA Postponed Indefinitely After Protests, CNN
MONEY (Jan. 20, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/20/technology/SOPA_PIPA_
postponed/.
356. Adrian Johns Curriculum Vitae, UNIV. OF CHICAGO, http://home.uchicago.edu/
~johns/cv.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
357. Adrian Johns, The Information Defense Industry and the Culture of Networks, AMODERN,
http://amodern.net/article/the-information-defense-industry-and-the-culture-of-
networks/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
358. WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION, http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Home (last modi-
fied Aug. 14, 2014).
359. Jimmy Wales & Kat Walsh, We Are the Media, and So Are You, WASH. POST (Feb. 9,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-are-the-media-and-so-are-you/2012/
02/09/gIQAfNW81Q_story.html.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
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lay public or the value of the collective model of production. New
legislative efforts, including the Trans Pacific Partnership363 negotia-
tions, still support a stronger copyright regime and do not respond to
the public’s discontent of Congress’s abandoned precedents.364 Public
interest organizations continue to protest against such negotiations,
and the copyright war persists.365 However, the political balance of
power has changed, and the public now expresses their discontent
with the passive role copyright law has assigned them and strives to
have its voice heard.366
For example, Creative Commons,367 a leading organization in the
free culture movement, used to take a more ambivalent role in the
copyright wars. While free software activists were seeking to surpass
copyright law with a philosophy that prioritizes users’ freedoms, Crea-
tive Commons conformed to the copyright regime while also cham-
pioning authors’ rights.368 But in 2013, after an international meeting
in Buenos Aires, Creative Commons openly stated that private order-
ing strategies have limitations, and expressed its commitment to sup-
port copyright reform to benefit the public interest.369
363. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www
.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited June 6, 2014).
364. See generally Michel A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An Alphabet Soup of Innova-
tion-Stifling Copyright Legislation and Agreements, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 21, 30-31
(2013).
365. See, e.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ELECTRONIC FRONT. FOUND., https://
www.eff.org/issues/tpp (last visited Apr. 21, 2014); The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement:
Your Guide to Copyright in the TPP, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, http://tppinfo.org/ (last visited Apr.
21, 2014); Joe Wolverton II, SOPA: Dead in Congress, Alive in Trans-Pacific Partnership, NEW
AMERICAN (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/item/17861-sopa-
dead-in-congress-alive-in-trans-pacific-partnership.
366. See James Temple, ‘SOPA Blackout’ is Web’s Political Coming of Age, S.F. CHRONICLE
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/technology/dotcommentary/article/SOPA-Black-
out-is-Web-s-political-coming-of-age-2619699.php (regarding the anti-SOPA campaign as
the new form of politics); Matt Stempeck, #DontBreakTheInternet: How the Web Became a Politi-
cal Force v. SOPA, PBS (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/idealab/2011/11/dontbreak
theinternet-how-the-web-became-a-political-force-vs-sopa322/.
367. About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited June
6, 2014). Creative Commons publishes and maintains copyright licenses “that give the pub-
lic permission to share and use [author’s] creative work[s]—on conditions of [the au-
thors’s] choice.” Id.
368. See Shun-Ling Chen, To Surpass or to Conform—What are Public Licenses For?, 2009 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 107, 117-21 (2009).
369. Timothy Vollmer, Supporting Copyright Reform, CREATIVE COMMONS BLOG (Oct. 16,
2013), https://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/39639 (explaining Creative Commons
cannot be restricted in the role of a mere license steward, but should also take part in the
copyright reform).
118 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
The public spectacle surrounding SOPA and PIPA has not been
repeated. Wikipedia declared that it would only use a blackout tech-
nique sparingly as a last resort.370 However, it is uncertain if such a
campaign would work for a second time. It is interesting to observe
how Congress or courts would recognize, if at all, the value of works
produced by the collaborative lay public, as well as the active role the
lay public plays in promoting useful arts and sciences. For those who
discredit Wikipedia’s editing model, the powerful effect of a blackout
still may not give Wikipedia credibility. However, it recognizes that,
although Encyclopaedia Britannica still is viewed as more trustworthy,371
Wikipedia is significant in our contemporary life and politics, and has
the ability to persuade people to participate in an orchestrated
campaign.
The publishing industry is likely to continue discrediting the lay
public’s collaborative efforts by promoting the assumption that only
professionals can ensure the quality of a work. The lay public’s come-
back challenges the link between quality and professionals, or the
symbolic power to which the lay public has submitted to professionals.
To be certain, Wikipedia cares about the quality of its work and ad-
ministers a standard of reliability for included information.372 But,
Wikipedia does not aspire to become trusted in the same way as Ency-
clopaedia Britannica. Rather, its model calls for users to be vigilant in
evaluating the quality of information and to become contributors
through which users will acquire new literacy skills. The mass collabo-
ration model is not just a distributed model of production, as it calls
for a looser connection between established institutions, formal cre-
dentials, and quality in cultural works. Instead, the model also paral-
lels an epistemological model that helps reorient the relationship
between knowledge and symbolic power.
Conclusion—Toward a More Inclusive Semiotic Democracy
The association between the author as the producer of copy-
righted works and a source of professional authority is under-explored
370. Wales & Walsh, supra note 359 (“[P]rotests like the Wikipedia blackout are a last
resort.”). Wales and Walsh stated that Wikipedia’s core mission is “mak[ing] knowledge
freely available,” and not advocacy. Id.
371. See Andrew J. Flanagin & Miriam J. Metzger, From Encyclopaedia Britannica to
Wikipedia: Generational Differences in the Perceived Credibility of Online Encyclopedia Information,
14 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 355, 355 (2011).
372. See Category: Wikipedia Content Policies, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Category:Wikipedia_content_policies (last modified Apr. 13, 2014)
Issue 1] EXPOSING PROFESSIONALISM IN U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 119
in copyright literature.373 Professor Joseph Miller posits that by grant-
ing copyright protection to mediocre works, contemporary U.S. copy-
right law leads to a proliferation of pedestrian authors.374 However, by
examining legislative history detailing the expansion of copyrightable
subject matter and court decisions on joint work cases, this Article
exposes the persisting connection between the recognition of the “ex-
pert” and authorship in U.S. copyright law. This connection justifies a
copyright system that prefers expert authors. By privileging profes-
sional practitioners over their collaborators who are not considered
professionals or rather have expertise in a different field, copyright
law reinforces the authority of expert authors, and distributes sym-
bolic resources within society accordingly.
Facilitated by recent information and communication technolo-
gies, the traditional model of distribution that heavily relied on pro-
fessional practitioners is now being challenged. Not only is the
boundary between users and authors blurred, but also the reliance on
professional publishers decreases as the number of channels of distri-
bution multiply. The new digital environment allows for new and ex-
perimental works with various degrees of decentralization and
collaboration. These developments excite and inspire many new
forms of cultural production and create new roles for citizens to per-
form.375 Although the public has been disenfranchised by copyright
law’s history that ties progress to professional practices, members of
373. See Margaret Chon, The Romantic Collective Author, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 829,
830-31 (2012) (noting that the issue of authority is addressed in the romantic authorship
critiques, but is less developed).
Less developed, but still central to these critiques [of romantic authorship], is
their claim that the romantic individual author has too influential a role in author-
izing an approved set of cultural practices as “secular prophet with privileged ac-
cess to experience of the numinous and a unique ability to translate that
experience for the masses of less gifted consumers.”
Id. (quoting Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, Introduction, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AU-
THORSHIP: TEXTUALIST APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 20, at 3). Chon
also quotes Peter Jaszi’s more recent statement as a continual endorsement of his position:
“[O]ne of the specific roles assigned to creative and scientific genius was the work of im-
posing a comprehensible pattern on the evidence of experience.” Id. at 831 (quoting Peter
Jaszi, Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CREATIVE
PRODUCTION IN LEGAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 315, at 413, 414-15). Chon
states that the romantic authorship critique contains two strands: one is the author as the
“genius,” and the less developed examines the author as the “cultural arbiter.” Id.
This Article separates the two strands completely. Viewing the cultural arbiter strand as a
subset of genius is not helpful for fully investigating the development of the authority
associated with professionalism.
374. Miller, supra note 3, at 458.
375. See supra text accompanying notes 361-62.
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the public have gradually taken up a more proactive role in the mean-
ing-making process in our society. This is the belief and the hope of
those who advocate for a semiotic democracy.376
Much scholarship is devoted to reforming the copyright system.
Such scholarship advocates for a less restrictive copyright regime that
encourages reinterpretations of existing works, emphasizes free
speech rights, and prevents copyright owners from imposing artificial
limitations on the use of their works by outlawing legitimate techno-
logical uses.377 These are all important ways to help cultivate a robust
semiotic democracy. However, copyright’s role in the distribution of
symbolic resources enables professional practitioners and the copy-
right industry to continue asserting themselves as the exclusive pro-
ducers of quality work, hindering the public, who are viewed as
amateurs or mere consumers, from participating effectively in culture
and society.378
Works generated by the lay public are now abundant, and many
self-organized collaborative projects continue to thrive. Online collab-
orative projects question the authority of the traditional publication
channels and offer new mediums, but do not claim to be the new
dominant authority. Rather, these innovations remind people to avoid
blindly submitting to the authority of professionals, and to learn to
evaluate the quality of information in different ways.379 Conversely,
professional practitioners that continue to rely on the conventional
models of copyright and knowledge production discredit the work of
laymen.380
376. See FISHER, supra note 28, at 30-31.
377. See, e.g., Dan Burk, Anti Circumvention Misuse 4, 15 (Minnesota Pub. Law Research
Paper No.02-10, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
320961; Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 286
(2006).
378. However, not everyone advocating for legal reform in intellectual property rights
wants a general relaxation of the exclusive control currently awarded to the property own-
ers. See Robert D. Cooter, Freedom, Creativity, and Intellectual Property, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
1, 10 (2013) (advocating for legal patent reform that would give owners weak (or no)
protection against innovators but strong protection against producers and consumers in
order to bring about more innovation and societal progress).
Nevertheless, the differences between those who want more relaxed intellectual property
rights and those who do not begs the question of how legislative lines are drawn. In partic-
ular, this Article highlights how we distinguish innovators and authors from mere consum-
ers, how we identify the professor practitioners as innovators and the public as consumers,
and how we have come to assume that professionals are more likely to make more valuable
contributions than the public. Studies on user innovation point to the complexity of this
assumption. See generally ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZATION INNOVATION (2005).
379. See supra Part IV.C.
380. See id.
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This Article attacks the link between professionalism’s symbolic
power and copyright. With aid of the image of the expert author, cop-
yright law is vulnerable to seizures by self-interested professional orga-
nizations. Exposing professionalism in copyright law is not only
insightful for exploring the history of copyright authorship. Such ex-
posure calls for a serious reevaluation of the relationship between
knowledge and symbolic power and the role copyright plays in endors-
ing the credibility and authority of professional practitioners. This no-
tion is especially important to recognize while examining the recent
copyright politics. The long-disenfranchised lay public has returned to
debate, challenging established institutions on how society evaluates
the quality of a product. The public is also questioning whether a re-
strictive copyright system that gives priority to professionals is in soci-
ety’s best interest. Exposing professionalism in copyright law is key to
obtaining copyright reform that moves toward a more inclusive semi-
otic democracy.
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